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Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection 
THE CULTURAL BIAS AGAINST  
“MIND READING” DEVICES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last fifteen years, scientists have discovered a 
way to watch the brain think.1  New functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) technology can take pictures of a 
person’s brain at the very moment the person is engaged in a 
task.2  An fMRI machine can generate images that vividly show 
which brain regions are at work while, say, answering a 
question or telling a story.3  Studies show that a person 
answering a question truthfully uses relatively few brain 
regions, typically those associated with memory.4  Telling a lie, 
however, seems to require many more brain regions, including 
those linked to calculation and cognitive control.5  Thus, by 
showing how much brain activity is taking place and where in 
the brain the activity is occurring, fMRI technology can reveal 
one’s cognitive tasks.6 
  
 1 See Roberta Conlan, A Life-Saving Window on the Mind and Body: The 
Development of Magnetic Resonance Imaging, in NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., BEYOND 
DISCOVERY: THE PATH FROM RESEARCH TO HUMAN BENEFIT (2001), 
http://www.beyonddiscovery.org/content/view.page.asp?I=135 (“The breakthrough that 
led to functional MRI, fMRI as it is known, came in the early 1980s, when George 
Radda and colleagues at the University of Oxford, England, found that MRI could be 
used to register changes in the level of oxygen in the blood, which in turn could be used 
to track physiological activity.”); Columbia fMRI, The Future Role of functional MRI in 
Medical Applications, http://www.fmri.org/fmri.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (“The 
recent discovery that magnetic resonance imaging can be used to map changes in brain 
hemodynamics that correspond to mental operations extends traditional anatomical 
imaging to include maps of human brain function. . . . This new ability to directly 
observe brain function opens an array of new opportunities to advance our 
understanding of brain organization . . . .”). 
 2 Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Seeks Information About Government Use of 
Brain Scanners in Interrogations (June 28, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/privacy/medical/ 
26035prs20060628.html. 
 3 Id.; Columbia fMRI, supra note 1. 
 4 Steve Silberman, Don’t Even Think About Lying: How Brain Scans are 
Reinventing the Science of Lie Detection, WIRED, Jan. 2006, at 142. 
 5 Id.  See infra note 47. 
 6 Silberman, supra note 4, at 142. 
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At the moment, two rival companies, Cephos Corp.7 and 
No Lie MRI, Inc.,8 are competing for the new market in fMRI 
lie-detection technology.9  They hope to assist defendants who 
would voluntarily submit to the test in order to bolster claims 
of innocence.10  The companies “use similar techniques, but 
different software” to analyze the scans.11  They both want to be 
the first to successfully use the technology at trial.12  No court 
has passed judgment on the new test’s admissibility.13  
However, while the science is still being tested,14 No Lie MRI 
administered the first commercial use of fMRI lie detection in 
December of last year.15  Cephos has not begun commercial 
  
 7 The company is headquartered in Pepperell, Massachusetts.  See Cephos 
Corp., Contact, http://www.cephoscorp.com/contact.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).  
Note that David Faigman, leading evidence scholar and author of the treatise Modern 
Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony, is a legal advisor to 
Cephos.  See Cephos Corp., Legal Advisors, http://www.cephoscorp.com/legal.htm (last 
visited May 18, 2007). 
 8 Headquartered in San Diego, California.  Vicki Haddock, Lies Wide Open, 
Researchers Say Technology Can Show When and How a Lie is Created Inside the 
Brain, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 2006, at E1. 
 9 See Silberman, supra note 4, at 146.  No Lie MRI currently claims “fifty 
prospective clients.”  Haddock, supra note 8, at E1 (The prospective clients include, 
“wives who want to assure their husbands of their sexual fidelity, fathers fighting 
accusations of child molestation in child-custody disputes, and one California 
defendant the company won’t identify who faces the possibility of a death penalty 
unless he can convince a jury of his innocence.”).  Cephos maintains that it receives “at 
least a call a week” from potential clients.  Telephone Interview with Steven Laken, 
Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Cephos Corp., in Pepperell, Mass. (Oct. 27, 
2006) [hereinafter Laken Transcript] (transcript at 5:13; on file with author). 
 10 See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 4:24-5:3 (discussing Cephos’ aims); 
Haddock supra note 8, at E1 (suggesting No Lie MRI’s aims).  It is important to note 
that voluntary submission generally renders moot various constitutional challenges the 
technology may imply regarding illegal searches and self-incrimination.  For a 
discussion of fMRI lie detection and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, see, for 
example, Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal 
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301 (2006). 
 11 Richard Willing, MRI Tests Offer a Look at the Brains Behind the Lies, 
USA TODAY, June 27, 2006, at 5A.  See No Lie MRI, http://www.noliemri.com (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
 12 See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 6:20-7:20, 9:20-24.  
 13 As of March 21, 2007, Lexis and Westlaw searches of “functional magnetic 
resonance imaging” and of “fMRI” reveal no state or federal case concerning lie 
detection.  A handful of federal cases discuss fMRI at length in reference to proving 
detrimental effects of violent video games on children.  E.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. 
Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  See also Silberman, supra note 4, at 
150. 
 14 Silberman, supra note 4, at 150. 
 15 Phil McKenna, Can a Brain Scan Prove You’re Telling the Truth?, 
NEWSCIENTIST.COM, Feb. 10, 2007, at 13, http://www.newscientist.com/channel/opinion/ 
mg19325904.600-can-a-brain-scan-prove-youre-telling-the-truth.html.  (A deli-owner, 
being sued by his insurance company after his building was consumed in a fire, was 
attempting to demonstrate that he did not set the fire.)  There is no indication that an 
evidentiary hearing has taken place. 
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tests, insisting that further studies still need to be done to 
prove to the courts the technology’s validity.16   
The New York Times, in a recent article on the subject, 
put forward the common wisdom: Once this technology’s proven 
accuracy reaches ninety to ninety-five percent, trial courts will 
admit it.17  This Note suggests that such an analysis fails to 
take into account one powerful factor: society’s suspicion and 
fear of “mind reading” technologies.  Beyond and beneath the 
established evidentiary hurdles, a cultural dislike of such 
technologies will further stiffen the admissibility requirements.  
United States District Judge for the Southern District of New 
York Jed Rakoff spoke this year at a panel discussing fMRI lie 
detectors.18  The title of his presentation betrays a lurking, 
individualized skepticism perhaps shared by other members of 
  
 16 Laken released a statement on the Cephos website during the same month 
as the No Lie MRI commercial launch.  The statement reads in part:  
Because of the power inherent in the ability to distinguish truth from 
deception and because of the potential of such technologies to create changes 
in social behavior, the team at CEPHOS believes that it is incumbent upon us 
to be particularly thorough before releasing any products to the commercial 
market.  And we intend to ensure that we hold ourselves to the highest 
scientific standards by conducting reproducible experiments.  We feel 
strongly that any entity offering commercial services in this field should limit 
their availability to those areas where peer-reviewed scientific data supports 
their use.  
Press Release, Cephos Corp., Cephos’ CEO speaks on Commercial Testing (Dec. 2006), 
http://www.cephoscorp.com/cephos_comm_testing_20061215%20v2.pdf [hereinafter 
CEO speaks].  Laken also states, “we are focused in the near-term on the national 
security marketplace, where fMRI technology has specialized applicability to unique 
and critical issues within the U.S. Government.”  Id.  Cephos is currently doing a study 
funded by the Defense Department.  Michael Arndt, Scanning the Brain—For Lies, 
BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 2005, at 123. 
 17 Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand: How Neuroscience is Transforming 
the Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, (Magazine), at 53 (cover story) (“Steven 
Laken, the president of Cephos, . . . says he hopes to reach the 90-percent- to 95-
percent-accuracy range—which should be high enough to satisfy the Supreme Court’s 
standards for the admission of scientific evidence.  Judy Illes, director of Neuroethics at 
the Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, says, ‘I would predict that within five years, 
we will have technology that is sufficiently reliable at getting at the binary question of 
whether someone is lying that it may be utilized in certain legal settings.’”).  See Pardo, 
supra note 10, at 304-05 (stating that sufficient accuracy along with a proper 
understanding of the technology will lead to admittance).  For discussion of Pardo’s 
analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 343-50. 
 18 See Corydon Ireland, Symposium: “Will Brain Imaging Be Lie Detector Test 
of the Future?”, HARV. UNIV. GAZETTE, Feb. 8, 2007, available at 
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2007/02.08/01-lying.html (referencing Judge 
Rakoff’s comments from a recent symposium at the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, entitled Is There Science Underlying Truth Detection?). 
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the judiciary: Can Science Detect Lies?  Not in My Court.19  One 
need only examine the history of polygraph evidence to see that 
an important cultural prejudice against devices that betray the 
brain’s private workings provides a further obstacle towards 
acceptance.20  The bold courtroom aspirations of fMRI 
advocates will hinge on their ability to distinguish it from the 
polygraph and quell Orwellian fears, as much as it will on 
proving the technology’s validity.  
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. that reopened the door to 
polygraph admittance, even the most accurate of polygraph 
techniques (which are more accurate than many forms of 
admissible expert evidence)21 have been routinely rejected.  
While evidentiary law, attempts to steer clear of such cultural 
stigmas, the Daubert analysis, the Province of the Jury 
doctrine, and Rule 403 relevance analysis all are susceptible to 
such leanings.  As a result, no matter how accurate the 
technology becomes, nor how meticulously a party briefs the 
relevant doctrines, the looming societal aversion toward “mind 
reading” machines may affect the judicial ruling.22  
There are a host of reasons why this technology ought to 
fare better in trial courts than its oft-excluded23 predecessor, 
the polygraph.  (In fact, the two companies are already trying 
to distinguish their analyses from the polygraph’s.24)  The 
polygraph measures the physiological response to deception—
  
 19 Id.  Judge Rakoff went on to critique the methodology and claimed cross-
examination is still the most useful tool to detect a lie.  Id. 
 20 Judge Rakoff compared fMRI technology to the polygraph during his 
critique.  Id.  See infra note 291. 
 21 See infra text accompanying note 185. 
 22 This is despite the willingness of the fMRI subjects. 
 23 John C. Bush, Note, Warping the Rules: How Some Courts Misapply 
Generic Evidentiary Rules To Exclude Polygraph Evidence, 59 VAND. L. REV. 539, 542-
52 (2006). 
 24 See Silberman, supra note 4, at 146 (Steven Laken says, “‘The biggest 
challenge is that this is new to a lot of different groups of people.  You have to get 
lawyers and district attorneys to understand this isn’t a polygraph.  I view it as no 
different than developing a diagnostic test.’”).  No Lie MRI’s website has an entire web 
page devoted to competing technologies.  No Lie MRI, Competing Technologies, 
http://www.noliemri.com/products/CompetingTechnologies.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 
2007).  At the top of the page, the company states: “The classification of human 
deception by No Lie MRI . . . software is far superior to all other methods, including 
polygraphs . . . .”  Id.  Cephos has a web page devoted exclusively to frequently asked 
questions regarding polygraphs, including a link to purchase a recent published 
national study criticizing polygraph tests.  Cephos Corp., Polygraph, 
http://www.cephoscorp.com/polygraph_faq.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). 
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the stress and nervousness that comes from lying.25  The fMRI, 
however, watches the brain activity involved in executing the 
cognitive task that is deception; a task that, researchers allege, 
is more difficult to dissimulate.26  The assumption is that even 
a trained counter-spy must use creativity and calculation to 
formulate a new lie, and the most nervous Nellie will use 
memory to recount an event in her past.27  Moreover, as 
opposed to the squiggly-lined printouts of the polygraph, the 
fMRI process can be explained using clear, high-contrast 
images of the brain with the regions at work appearing in 
bright colors.28  Furthermore, the fMRI appears less subject to 
examiner bias because the exam questions are presented 
visually on a screen and the analysis is performed using 
computer software.29 
Nevertheless, judges may well use the flexible 
evidentiary standard that the Supreme Court laid down in 
Daubert,30 designed in part to embrace newer technology,31 to 
apply a stricter standard to the fMRI than it would to other 
scientific evidence.  Critics already argue that Daubert’s loose, 
non-exclusive list of factors, upon which trial courts determine 
the relevance and reliability of scientific evidence, permit 
  
 25 Charles N.W. Keckler, Cross-Examining The Brain: A Legal Analysis of 
Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 543 (2006). 
 26 See Press Release, Radiological Soc’y of N. Am., Who’s the Liar? Brain 
Stands Up to Polygraph Test (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www2.rsna.org/ 
pr/target.cfm?ID=273 (quoting one researcher claiming that “‘[s]ince brain activation is 
arguably less susceptible to being controlled by an individual, our research will 
hopefully eliminate the shortcomings of the conventional polygraph test and produce a 
new method of objective lie detection that can be used reliably in a courtroom or other 
setting.’”). 
 27 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 28 Sample brain scan images can be found at the Cephos and No Lie MRI 
websites.  Cephos Corp., Photographs, http://www.cephoscorp.com/photos.htm (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2007); No Lie MRI, Product Overview, http://www.noliemri.com/ 
products/Overview.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007). 
 29 See infra Part II.C.3. 
 30 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993) (holding that trial judges should consider a list 
of non-exclusive factors in exercising gate-keeping function). 
 31 See id. at 589 (contrasting Frye’s “austere standard” with the “‘liberal 
thrust’” of the Federal Rules and their “‘general approach of relaxing the traditional 
barriers to “opinion” testimony.’” (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 
169 (1988))).  See also United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The 
Federal Rules of Evidence, although concededly more liberal than the Frye test, still 
require a determination that the proffered scientific evidence is both relevant and 
reliable.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony by Ethicists: What Should be the 
Norm?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 198, 205 (2005). 
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cultural phenomena to color the judges’ decisions.32  If this is so, 
society’s incredulity and trepidation of “mind reading” devices 
might further tip the evidentiary analysis towards exclusion.33  
This Note examines the various evidentiary aspects of 
the fMRI debate and how it diverges from the corresponding 
polygraph discussion and suggests that the tendency to 
associate fMRI tests with polygraphs, as well as other “mind 
reading” techniques, may be a more significant liability for 
fMRI admission than the law itself.  Nevertheless, assuming 
future tests of fMRI technology continue to demonstrate 
accuracy in lie detection in both clinical trials and “real world” 
conditions, the test should be allowed into the nation’s 
courtrooms.34  Section II explains the fMRI technology used to 
detect deception and contrasts it with the traditional polygraph 
methods.  Section III lays out an evidentiary analysis under 
Rules 702 and 403, as well as the Province of the Jury doctrine, 
demonstrating that, soon, a court may validly admit fMRI 
evidence.  Finally, Section IV suggests that factors beyond the 
black-letter law, such as the stigma of the polygraph and the 
cultural wariness of “mind reading,” may improperly influence 
a court’s analysis of fMRI evidence.  Thus, courts will have to 
contend with two hurdles, not one—the evidentiary doctrine 
and the cultural stigma.  Failing to clearly parse these two 
factors will (1) lead to what appears to be a suspect evidentiary 
analysis and (2) leave these two companies unable to properly 
prepare for the inevitable courtroom battles in the numerous 
jurisdictions throughout the country. 
II. TECHNOLOGY 
Because fMRI technology is so readily associated with 
the polygraph, despite fundamental (and judicially relevant) 
distinctions, Section II seeks to compare and contrast the two 
processes.  Part A will explain how fMRI technology works and 
discuss its current state of development given published 
  
 32 See, e.g., A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What 
Empirical Studies Tell Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 110 
(2005). 
 33 Devin Brennan, Book Note, Carl F. Cranor’s Toxic Torts: Science, Law, and 
the Possibility of Justice, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 565, 566 n.8 (2006) (Cranor “argues 
that, because of prejudicial tendencies in both science and legal procedure, much of the 
burden of scientific misunderstanding falls on plaintiffs in cases in which proof of 
liability depends upon scientific and expert testimony.”). 
 34 See infra Part III.  
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studies.  Part B will provide a brief description of the 
polygraph.   Finally, Part C will outline the key differences 
between the technologies to the extent they will affect an 
evidentiary analysis: Many of the various differences between 
fMRI technology and the polygraph should cause the fMRI 
exam to fare better under a proper Daubert and Province of the 
Jury analysis than the polygraph because the fMRI test (1) 
measures that which is more closely associated with deception, 
(2) promises increased accuracy, and (3) more computerized 
standards than the polygraph. 
A. How fMRI Technology Works 
1. Background on fMRI 
A traditional magnetic resonance imaging device (MRI) 
can produce a detailed image of a person’s brain.35  The subject 
lies within a large machine that is composed primarily of a 
magnet “50,000 times more powerful than . . . the earth’s 
magnetic field.”36  This magnet aligns the orientation of the 
hydrogen atoms in the brain37 each of which acts like a 
miniscule compass.38  The machine then sends out a “short 
pulse of radiofrequency energy” that disrupts the atoms’ 
orientation.39  Finally, as the atoms realign, they each “give off 
small amounts of energy,” and the MRI machine can map the 
locations of each energy burst.  The resolution of the resulting 
image “is less than 0.5 mm, about the size of the tip of a typical 
ballpoint pen.”40 
An fMRI machine uses the same technology to take 
pictures of the brain during a specific cognitive process such as 
answering a question or looking at an image.41  The pictures 
  
 35 Silberman, supra note 4, at 142. 
 36 A. Parry & P.M. Matthews, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI): A “Window” into the Brain (Ctr. for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of 
the Brain, Dep’t of Clinical Neurology, Univ. of Oxford, 2002), available at 
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fmri_ intro/fmri_intro.php. 
 37 Approximately 70% of the brain is water, which is composed of hydrogen 
and oxygen.  Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 fMRI research is “focused on the investigation of the neurocircuitry of the 
brain that underlies cognition, perception and action.”  Joy Hirsch, The Neurocircuitry 
of Mind: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigations of Brain Structure 
and Function (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Neurobiology and Behavior), 
http://www.cumc.columbia.edu/dept/neurobeh/Hirsch_center.html (last visited Mar. 30, 
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reveal which brain regions are involved in a particular 
cognitive task by showing the newly oxygenated blood’s 
location.42  The companies promoting fMRI lie detection assert 
that certain regions of the brain have been associated with 
various types of deception in a broad spectrum of people.43   The 
underlying theory is that, when one is questioned, a normal 
cognitive reaction is to formulate a truthful answer.44  
Therefore, deception involves overriding, or thwarting, the 
impulse and then carrying out the deception.45  Scientists 
disagree to an extent on precisely which brain regions are 
directly associated with lying,46 but generally agree that there 
is more activity in the prefrontal lobe during a lie because this 
is where cognitive reasoning takes place.47  
  
2007).  For now, lie-detection studies have reportedly focused on answering yes-or-no 
questions put to the subject via computer screen.  Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 
19:19-20:22.  It is not clear whether a person who is carefully choosing language to 
manipulate the truth will present similarly to one who is lying.  Publications have not 
yet addressed this issue head on.  But see G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different 
Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830 (2003) (finding 
that memorized lies activate different regions than improvised lies but both involve 
similarly heightened brain activity).  The binary (yes/no) questioning may limit this 
problem. 
 42 See Conlan, supra note 1.  
 43 See, e.g., Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 36:21-37:11. 
 44 See Silberman, supra note 4, at 144. 
 45 Id. at 145. 
 46 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 36:21-37:11.  According to Laken, the 
areas each group is focusing on overlap somewhat.  Id. 
 47 Haddock, supra note 8, at E1.  A recent published study conducted by 
Daniel D. Langleben, the inventor of the technology used by No Lie MRI, see No Lie 
MRI, About Us, http://www.noliemri.com/aboutUs/Overview.htm, concluded that 
“[a]lthough lie and truth are mediated by a similar frontoparietal network, lie appears 
to be a more working memory-intensive activity, characterized by increased activation 
of the inferolateral cortex implicated in response selection, inhibition, and generation.”  
Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth From Lie in Individual Subjects With Fast 
Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262, 271 (2005).  Cephos’ research has 
isolated these five brain regions: “right anterior cingulate, right inferior frontal, right 
orbitofrontal, right middle frontal, and left middle temporal areas.”  Frank Andrew 
Kozel et al., A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL 
NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004) [hereinafter Kozel et al., Neural Correlates of 
Deception].  Previous studies have demonstrated that the right inferior and 
orbitofrontal cortex are associated with inhibiting responses and controlling emotions.  
Id.  Note that to the limited extent the brain activity associated with lying relates to 
emotional responses, the fMRI suffers some of the same vulnerabilities as the 
polygraph, namely affects from general anxiety surrounding the test, countermeasures 
based on emotional control, and perhaps Province of the Jury attacks.  See infra Part 
III.B.2.  In addition, some “regions of the cingulate gyrus have been studied for their 
involvement in attention, concentration, and multitasking.”  Kozel et al., Neural 
Correlates of Deception, supra, at 855. 
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Furthermore, because telling a lie involves more 
“conscious control” than telling the truth,48 more areas of the 
brain are involved.49  Cephos has focused on a set of brain 
regions and divided them up into roughly 700 small three-
dimensional quadrants referred to as voxels.50  A voxel is 
considered activated when there is newly-oxygenated blood 
present in that area and it meets a minimal statistical 
threshold.51  The more voxels that are activated in the larger 
brain region, the more involved the cognitive activity.52  
Neutral questions establish the level of voxel activation during 
a truthful answer.53  This number varies from individual to 
individual based on the person’s brain activation pattern.54  
Additional questions establish the subject’s voxel activation 
during a lie; studies show more voxel activation here.55  The 
responses to the pertinent questions are then compared to 
these two levels.56 
One major study found that twice as many brain regions 
were activated during a deceptive response.57  While seven 
areas were measured as having increased use while a person 
gave a truthful response, fourteen areas were at work during a 
lie.58  Therefore, a jury will be able to consider not only whether 
a subject used a particular brain region associated with lying 
during a particular response, but the presumably more 
  
 48 F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 605 (2005) [hereinafter Kozel et 
al., Detecting Deception].  Note that the theory of additional conscious effort is the same 
principle offered to the court in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), 
concerning the polygraph.  See infra note 82. 
 49 Beth W. Orenstein, Guilty? Investigating fMRI’s Future as a Lie Detector, 
RADIOLOGY TODAY, May 16, 2005, at 30. 
 50 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 38:14-24.  A voxel is approximately 
three cubic millimeters.   
 51 See id. at 2:18-23, 38:18-20. 
 52 Id. at 38:14-39:4. 
 53 Id. at 40:10-12. 
 54 Id. at 39:19-40:7.  Factors for this include heart rate and innate hemo-
dynamic response.  See infra Part II.B.  
 55 See, e.g., Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth 
Telling About an Ecologically Valid Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph 
Investigation--Initial Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679, 679 (2006). 
 56 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 43:20-25.  Laken raises the importance 
in maintaining transparency in the software algorithm used to interpret the voxel 
count.   
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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apparent issue of whether the subject used significantly more 
brain regions.59 
Granted, even the technology’s most ardent supporters 
acknowledge limitations to the fMRI’s accuracy.60  However, if 
the triers of fact can learn to use this technology the way they 
use other admitted scientific or forensic technologies, only 
insomuch as it is pertinent in a particular case, the technology 
may be helpful61 without being unduly62 prejudicial.63   
2. State of the Field 
The director of Neuroethics at the Stanford Center for 
Biomedical Ethics asserts “that within five years, we will have 
technology that is sufficiently reliable at getting at the binary 
question of whether someone is lying [such] that it may be 
utilized in certain legal settings.”64  Nevertheless, Cephos gets 
approximately “two to three” calls per week from people who 
want to be tested.65  The company, however, is not yet 
sufficiently satisfied with its accuracy rate to begin operating 
commercially.66  When the tests show a 90% accuracy rate in 
successfully detecting deception, the company says it will open 
for business.67  Steven Laken, Cephos Founder and Chief 
Executive Officer, believes that a 90%-95% accuracy rate68 will 
  
 59 It is important to note that fMRI exams are only meant to detect an 
intentional act to con or deceive.  Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 22:25-23:1.  The 
subject must know that he or she is lying, or else the decision-making and response 
inhibition that the test detects may not take place.  Id. at 23:4-20.  A person truly 
convinced of a proposition, regardless of its actual truth, is not lying and will likely 
appear on the brain scan to be telling the truth.  Id. at 23:4-24. 
  Therefore, there are people with mental conditions associated with altered 
conceptions of reality that may confound the test.  Id. at 4:21-24.  In this regard, the 
fMRI and the polygraph appear similarly limited.  No fMRI studies are purportedly 
being done on compulsive liars, schizophrenics, or the mentally retarded.  See id.   
 60 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 2:24-3:1. 
 61 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). 
 62 See FED. R. EVID. 403.   
 63 See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 2:24-3:11. 
 64 Rosen, supra note 17, at 53. 
 65 Id.  Harvard University Provost and Professor of Neurobiology at Harvard 
Medical School Steven Hyman premised the conference on the notion that “[t]here’s an 
incredible hunger to have some test that separates truth from deception . . . .”  Ireland, 
supra note 18. 
 66 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 5:16-6:21; CEO speaks, supra note 16. 
 67 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 5:22-24. 
 68 False positives and false negatives cannot be isolated yet.  Until studies 
examine multiple aspects of the same event, an incorrect reading is both a false 
positive and a false negative.  Telephone Interview with Steven Laken (Apr. 9, 2007). 
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surpass the abilities of available technologies69 and warrant 
admissibility.70  Since Cephos has not yet reached 90% 
accuracy,71 its primary focus is to test and refine its 
technology.72  No Lie MRI is more confident, having already 
begun accepting clients.73   
As Cephos strives to cement error rates so that the 
accuracy can be clearly expressed to the court,74 it has limited 
its study population to people who are between the ages of 
eighteen and fifty, “fairly well educated,”75 non-medicated, and 
not current users of illegal drugs.76  Those with a past history of 
psychological problems have been excluded, and Cephos is not 
claiming the technology’s validity with psychopaths or 
pathological liars.77  (Presumably, the science is more 
complicated for these anomalies.)  Rather, the company is 
focusing on a prospective clientele of white-collar defendants 
and civil litigants who it expects to be most analogous to its 
test subjects.78   
B. How Polygraph Technology Works 
In contrast to fMRI technology’s focus on brain activity, 
polygraphs measure a set of physiological reactions associated 
with deceptive behavior.79  While the subject is being 
interviewed, the polygraph measures respiratory, electro-
  
 69 Rosen, supra note 17, at 53; Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 5:22-6:13.  
The new competing technologies in the lie-detection market are EEG or ‘brain 
fingerprinting’ designed by Lawrence Farwell, see Barnaby J. Feder, Truth and Justice, 
by the Blip of a Brainwave, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at F3, and voice stress technology, 
see Douglas Heingartner, It’s the Way You Say It, Truth Be Told, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 1, 
2004, at G1. 
 70 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 5:22-6:13. 
 71 Id. at 5:16-24.   
 72 Rosen, supra note 17, at 53. 
 73 McKenna, supra note 15, at 13. 
 74 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 3:7-11. 
 75 Id. at 4:2-5 (stating most test subjects had completed a high school 
education). 
 76 Id. at 3:14-4:16 (employing urine testing).  Cephos uses people of various 
ethnicities, English and non-English speakers, and both full-time and part-time 
employees. 
 77 Id. at 4:14-24.  
 78 Id. at 4:24-5:8.  If its first commercial use is an indication, No Lie MRI has 
also chosen to focus on civil litigants.  Because this narrow set of cases is limited to 
voluntary subjects, privacy concerns associated with involuntary testing are not 
relevant. 
 79 American Polygraph Association, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.polygraph.org/faq.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
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dermal, and cardiovascular data.80  The typical procedure 
tracks the subject’s breathing rate (using rubber tubes wrapped 
around the chest), perspiration (by attaching metal sensors to 
the fingers or palms), and both heart rate and blood pressure 
(with an arm cuff).81  These factors measure added effort,82 
stress, and nervousness, each of which tends to be present 
when a person lies.83  The data charts are graphed and 
analyzed.84  A polygraph examiner will typically ask questions 
for which the answers are known in order to establish a 
baseline reading of the physiological responses.85  Then the 
examiner will compare these results to responses during more 
probing questions.86  Because the exam is based on the subject’s 
stress levels, the examiner’s behavior may affect the results.87  
A polygraphist who is overly intimidated by, or particularly 
suspicious of the subject can engage in covert or overt methods 
to impact results.88   
To assess polygraph accuracy, one must look at both 
reliability and validity.89  Reliability measures the technique’s 
replicability.90  That is to say, if several qualified polygraphists 
can test the same subject and get similar results, then the 
technique is reliable and may be evaluated for validity.91  Of the 
several different questioning methods, two of the principal 
techniques are generally considered very reliable.92   
  
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“[T]he theory 
seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the 
utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood 
pressure.”). 
 83 Michael J. Ligons, Comment, Polygraph Evidence: Where Are We Now?, 65 
MO. L. REV. 209, 209 (2000). 
 84 American Polygraph Association, supra note 79. 
 85 Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence: Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 
895, 905 (1998) (“The examiner’s role cannot be overstated, because it is the examiner 
who decides whether there is sufficient indication of deception.”). 
 86 For a discussion of the various questioning techniques, see 4 DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 40:25-28 (2005-06). 
 87 Dan Eggen & Shankar Vedantam, Polygraph Results Often in Question: 
CIA, FBI Defend Test’s Use in Probes, WASH. POST, May 1, 2006, at A1. 
 88 Id. 
 89 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 40:25. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id.  (“Reliability and validity are related in that reliability is necessary, but 
is not sufficient for validity.”). 
 92 Id.  (The Control Question Test and the Guilty Knowledge Test both exhibit 
near perfect replicability.). 
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To determine validity, on the other hand, researchers 
are forced to look at clinical studies that present a tightly 
controlled environment with confirmable results, as well as 
field studies in which important real-life motivations and 
complexities exist.  Verifying accuracy is more treacherous in 
field studies, however, because there are rarely reliable ways to 
determine whether the subject has lied.93  Since validity varies 
significantly depending on the questioning method, the quality 
of the study, and whether it was clinical or in the field, 
polygraph results are complex and controversial.94  The highest-
quality studies of the most successful questioning-method have 
yielded average accuracy rates of 91% in laboratory tests and 
90.5% in field studies.95  The other commonly used questioning 
techniques had far lower accuracy rates.96  One court wrote:  
[S]ome studies indicate [that] the potential error rate is, at best, 
unknown.  Eleven studies of polygraph evidence showed a wide 
range of accuracy rates—from 48% to 90%—with an average rate of 
71%.  Two critics have maintained the Control Question Test 
approach is little better than “the toss of a coin.”97   
Furthermore, the National Research Council undertook an 
extensive study of polygraphs by looking at effectiveness in 
legal proceedings and employment contexts.98  The study 
determined that polygraph “evidence [was] scanty and 
scientifically weak” in part because “[t]he physiological 
responses measured by the polygraph are not uniquely related 
to deception.”99  Therefore, inaccurate polygraph techniques, 
susceptibility to examiner error, and doubts regarding a link 
between physiology and deception have stigmatized polygraph 
technology. 
  
 93 Id.  It is difficult to establish if a prisoner is in fact lying about the alleged 
crime, for example. 
 94 Id.   
 95 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, §§ 40:26, :30 (results of the Control 
Question Test). 
 96 Id. §§ 40:27-28. 
 97 United States v. Cordoba, 991 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(quoting W. Iacono & D. Lykken, The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph 
Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 
14-3 (D. Faigman et al. eds., 1997)). 
 98 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, BD. ON BEHAVIORAL, COGNITIVE, AND SENSORY 
SCIENCES AND COMM. ON NAT’L STAT., THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 212 (2003). 
 99 Id. 
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C. Key Distinctions Between fMRI Lie Detection and 
Polygraphs 
The fMRI technology should fare better under Daubert 
than the polygraph due primarily to the fMRI test’s focus on 
cognition, increased accuracy, and more extensive 
computerization. 
1. The Cognitive/Emotional Distinction 
Scientists maintain that fMRI technology examines the 
primary cognitive process, not a secondary emotional response, 
and should thus prove better against countermeasures than 
the polygraph.100  It is common lore that polygraphs can be 
beat.101  Subjects have used counter-measures, such as 
sedatives, to dampen their autonomic responses and stressors, 
such as flexing muscle or placing tacks in a shoe, to artificially 
inflate or create stress reactions.102  Presumably, the same 
techniques would not work to fool the fMRI because the fMRI 
scan is analyzing cognitive tasks associated with answering a 
question that take place regardless of stress levels.103  
However, many fMRI studies are being done in other 
fields to examine the extent to which people can alter which 
neural pathways they use.  Scientists studying pain control 
have found they were able to train test subjects to “learn to 
control activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex . . . , a 
region putatively involved in pain perception and regulation.”104  
Another study measured the extent to which paralyzed people 
using a “Brain Computer Interface” could be trained to 
regulate activity in specific brain regions so as to communicate 
with an external device.105   Recently, German scientists found 
  
 100 Silberman, supra note 4, at 144.   
 101 The CIA agent Aldrich Ames passed several polygraph tests despite being 
a Russian spy.  Id. 
 102 American Psychological Association, The Truth About Lie Detectors, 
PSYCHOL. MATTERS, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.psychologymatters.org/polygraphs.html; 
Susan McCarthy, Passing the Polygraph, SALON, Mar. 2, 2000, http://archive.salon.com/ 
health/feature/2000/03/02/lie_detection/index.html. 
 103 Silberman, supra note 4, at 144. 
 104 R. Christopher deCharms et al., Control over Brain Activation and Pain 
Learned by Using Real-Time Functional MRI, 102 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. 
OF SCI. IN THE U.S. (PNAS) 18626, 18626 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
 105 Thilo Hinterberger et al., Neural Mechanisms Underlying Control of a 
Brain-Computer-Interface, 21 EUR. J. NEUROSCIENCE 3169, 3169 (2005) (“The data 
support the assumption that human subjects learn the regulation of cortical excitation 
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that healthy subjects could be taught relatively quickly to self-
regulate their responsive brain oxygen level changes in certain 
areas of the brain.106  While the study was aimed at helping 
patients suffering paralysis or on respirators, the results 
indicate that regional brain activation is trainable.107  If so, 
perhaps one could train to lie without employing brain areas 
typically associated with deception. 
Nevertheless, amateur countermeasures by “normal” 
individuals have been shown preliminarily to be ineffective and 
subjects with anomalous behavior patterns (those who get 
nervous easily or those who are having an unrelated emotional 
response) presumably would not cause incorrect readings.108  
Thus the fMRI test’s cognitive focus promises to be more 
reliable than the polygraph’s physiological emphasis.109   
2. Accuracy of fMRI 
In theory, the fMRI will be far more accurate than the 
polygraph because it homes in on the source of the lie rather 
than the outward manifestations of the lie.110  In practice, 
though, indications of this accuracy are only in early stages.  
  
thresholds of large neuronal assemblies as a prerequisite for direct brain 
communication.”). 
 106 N. Birbaumer & R. Sitaram, BCI-Regulation of Neuronal Substrates of 
Emotions, 43 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY S20, S23-S24 (July 2006). 
 107 Id. 
 108 “Researchers believe that fMRI should be tougher to outwit because it 
detects something much harder to suppress: neurological evidence of the decision to 
lie.”  Silberman, supra note 4, at 144.  See also Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 21:9-
22:13 (claiming perfect accuracy against amateur countermeasures such as holding 
breath, delaying pressing a button, and visual imagery).  Some scientists, in unrelated 
lie-detection studies, have examined timing of responses as indicative of deception.  
See, e.g., Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, From Flawed Self-Assessment to Blatant 
Whoppers: The Utility of Voluntary and Involuntary Behavior in Detecting Deception, 
24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 673 (2006).  As stated above, no claims are being made that this 
test will be effective for those suffering from neurological disorders.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 77-78. 
 109 Robert P. Mosteller, Commentary, Evidence History, the New Trace 
Evidence, and Rumblings in the Future of Proof, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 538 (2006).  
There are suggestions that the increased brain activity is in part due to the emotional 
component of deception since some of the brain regions that the companies are 
monitoring have been associated with emotional states.  Kozel et al., Detecting 
Deception, supra note 48, at 605.  
 110 Mosteller, supra note 109, at 538 (“Conceptually, this new technology 
promises to advance lie detection greatly beyond the effectiveness of today’s 
polygraph. . . . I do not know that we will ever achieve a technology that reliably 
determines deception.  Functional MRI may in the end prove no better than earlier lie-
detection technologies, but it has a potential to move the process of determining 
deception forward even if it does not itself reach proficiency.”). 
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The CEO of No Lie MRI boasts 90% accuracy,111 which would 
make the fMRI more accurate than many polygraph tests.112  
However, there are only a handful of fMRI lie-detection studies 
and many of them tested only a small number of subjects.113  
One recent study yielded a 92% accuracy rate for detecting 
those who had lied and 70% for those who had told the truth.114  
However, there were only eleven subjects.115  In a twenty-two 
person study, the test accurately evaluated 99% of responses.116   
The largest published study to date appeared in the 
scientific, peer reviewed journal Biological Psychiatry and was 
done by the scientists working in collaboration with Cephos.117  
Sixty-one participants each took part in a mock-crime, stealing 
either a ring or a watch.118  Then, the participants each 
submitted to an fMRI exam in which they were asked whether 
they had stolen the ring and whether they had stolen the 
watch.119  They were instructed to deny stealing any object, 
thus telling one lie and one truth.120  The subjects were 
promised financial awards for being able to deceive the 
machine.121  According to the authors of the study, this was the 
first time that fMRI lie-detection results were analyzed by 
researchers who were unaware of which subjects were in fact 
lying.122  The researchers were able to differentiate the lies from 
the truth, thereby accurately determining the item “stolen” in 
  
 111 Haddock, supra note 8, at E1. 
 112 See Brain Scans May Beat Polygraphs at Lie Detection, FORBES.COM, Jan. 31, 
2006, http://www.forbes.com/lifestyle/health/feeds/hscout/2006/01/31/hscout530651.html; 
Press Release, Medical University of Southern California, Scientists: fMRI Can Detect 
Deception with 90% Accuracy (Sept. 26, 2005), available at 
http://www.musc.edu/pr/cephos.htm; Haddock, supra note 8, at E1. 
 113 Haddock, supra note 8, at E1.  
 114 Mohamed et al., supra note 55, at 679. 
 115 Id. 
 116 C. Davatzikos et al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with 
Machine Learning Methods: Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663 (2005).  
However, predictive accuracy was determined to be 88%.  Id.  See also Daniel 
Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects With Fast Event-
Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262 (2005).   
 117 Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605. 
 118 Id. at 605-06. 
 119 Id. at 605. 
 120 Id. at 605-06.  
 121 Id. at 606. 
 122 Cephos Corp., fMRI & Deception, http://www.cephoscorp.com/fmri_ 
deception.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).  This would ensure that those who analyzed 
the results would have no other information about the examinee other than the brain 
scan.  See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 14:24-25:15. 
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90% to 93% of the subjects.123  The errors were not related to 
the countermeasures some subjects employed to fool the 
machine.124  Larger studies are underway, especially by those 
commercially vested in the outcome,125 but it will be some time 
before these future studies can be confirmed or replicated by 
more neutral parties.   
A recent symposium on fMRI lie detection at the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, co-sponsored by 
Harvard University and the McGovern Institute for Brain 
Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, elicited 
opinions from three experts on the technology’s current 
accuracy.126  The three tended “to agree that the fMRI shows 
promise as a lie detector, but that current research is not 
enough to support using it now.”127  
Furthermore, fMRI tests face many of the same 
challenges that have plagued polygraph validity studies: It is 
difficult to replicate real-life motivations and complexities in 
the lab and on volunteers; and it is difficult in the field to 
distinguish an actual lie from a truth.128  Firstly, those who 
volunteer for studies on university campuses are a different 
demographic than the average criminal.129  Secondly, the 
subjects are screened and those who use illegal drugs or show 
signs of mental illness or medical complications may not 
participate.130  Thirdly, in the lab, the subjects are asked about 
recent, straightforward,131 relatively non-stigmatized events in 
a neutral setting.  Additionally, the laboratory subjects are not 
under the kind of stress that is characteristic of one who is 
falsely accused.  Finally, the motivation of winning a small 
cash award to fool the machine is quite different from that of 
  
 123 Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605.   
 124 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 21:9-22:13. 
 125 See, e.g., id. at 19:24-20:2.  Frank Andrew Kozel is a scientific advisor for 
Cephos, see Cephos Corp., Scientific Advisors, http://www.cephoscorp.com/ 
scientific.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007), and Christos Davatzikos is on the scientific 
board of No Lie MRI, see No Lie MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/aboutUs/ 
ScienceBoard.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).  Both men are responsible for a 
significant portion of the current research on fMRI lie detection.  See infra note 233. 
 126 Ireland, supra note 18. 
 127 Id. (expressing concern over the clinical studies inability to replicate real-
world emotional stakes and lack of testing regarding countermeasures such as mental 
imagery).   
 128 See 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 40:25. 
 129 Haddock, supra note 8, at E1.   
 130 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 4:9-16. 
 131 It is clear that one either took the watch or the ring.  There is little room 
for differing interpretations or viewpoints. 
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avoiding a significant penal consequence.132  However, the CEO 
of Cephos and the Biological Psychiatry study’s co-author, 
claims to recognize various limitations.133  For now, Cephos 
looks to work with primarily white-collar criminals and civil 
litigants who typically face less serious consequences than, say, 
violent criminals and suffer from fewer behavioral and mental 
conditions.134  In the study’s conclusion, he notes: “Further work 
is required to determine how well this technology will work in 
different settings or populations.”135  
3. Increased Computerization  
To a considerable degree, a computer administers and 
analyzes the fMRI such that the same properly developed and 
tested software can be used to test each new subject.136  In fact, 
Laken suggests that once the exam begins, there is typically no 
interaction between the subject and another person.137  The 
computer presents the question on a screen inside the MRI 
chamber, receives the answer from a modified keyboard 
controlled by the subject, randomly selects the next question, 
and, at the completion of the exam, processes the results.138  
The MRI takes multiple “snapshots” of the brain during the 
presentation of each question.139  The question order is 
essentially random, thus Cephos’ exam does not change as a 
result of previous answers.140 
The polygraph, however, has shown to be affected 
substantially by human examiners.141  One scholar writes: 
The examiner’s expertise is critical in (1) determining the suitability 
of the subject for testing, (2) formulating proper test questions, (3) 
establishing the necessary rapport with the subject, (4) detecting 
attempts to mask or create chart reactions, or other 
  
 132 Haddock, supra note 8, at E1. 
 133 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 2:24-3:5 (“Clearly, unlike DNA 
evidence, this technology is not going to be 100% accurate.  There will be limitations to 
its accuracy.  And, as such, what will obviously need to happen is the triers will have to 
figure out . . . how to use this evidence just like any other type of evidence . . . 
presented in a courtroom.”). 
 134 Id. at 4:24-5:8. 
 135 Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605. 
 136 See Willing, supra note 11, at 5A. 
 137 See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 14:19-23, 48:5-9. 
 138 Both the polygraph and the fMRI questions are written by a human being. 
 139 See Ireland, supra note 18.  
 140 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 21:5-7. 
 141 Eggen & Vedantam, supra note 87, at A1. 
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countermeasures, (5) stimulating the subject to react, and (6) 
interpreting the charts.142 
One might argue that the examiner’s question order may affect 
the subject’s reaction.  Psychologist William Iacono, suggested 
that bias can present a problem with polygraphers: 
Organizations that routinely test employees with the polygraph 
find very few senior employees fail the test.143  Meanwhile 30-
40% of lower-level employees fail.144  Iacono suggests that 
powerful subjects may intimidate polygraph examiners.145  
“‘The director of the CIA just took a test,’ said Iacono.  ‘How 
would you like to be the examiner who gave him a test and say 
he failed?  What kind of a career would you have?’”146   
Techniques such as numeric and computerized scoring 
have been developed to eliminate polygraph examiner error 
and variation.147  However, numeric scoring’s zero-to-three 
system appears crude compared to the fMRI method.148  In 
addition, computer scoring is relatively new and analyzed 
“input [still] depends on the examiner’s ability, a subjective” 
factor.149 
Given these differences between polygraph and fMRI 
technology, the few courts that have begun to welcome 
polygraphs should also admit fMRI evidence.  But more 
importantly, even courts that regularly reject polygraphs will 
have to independently examine fMRI evidence.   
  
 142 Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 905.  See infra note 184. 
 143 Eggen & Vedantam, supra note 87, at A1. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id.  There is also the related “friendly polygrapher issue.”  Giannelli, 
Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 915 (“[A] polygraph examination privately 
conducted by the defense may not be reliable because the fear of detection is not 
sufficiently realistic.”).   
 147 Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 909-10.  Furthermore, 
federally administered polygraph results are usually “independently reviewed by 
senior examiners.”  Id. at 910. 
 148 Id. at 909-10 (“The subject’s behavioral reactions are not considered, only 
the recorded chart reactions.  There are several different scoring systems.  The 
[Department of Defense] Polygraph Institute and the University of Utah have 
developed similar systems. . . . The scores range from 3 for a dramatic reaction to a 
control question to -3 for the same type of reaction to a relevant question.  Noticeable 
but smaller reactions are scored 1 or -1.  A lack of a significant reaction is scored 0.  
Total scores of 6 or higher indicate truthfulness, while -6 or lower indicate deception.  
Scores that fall in between are considered inconclusive.  The primary advantage of the 
numerical approach is that it ‘helps to ensure a rigorous, semi-objective evaluation of 
the physiological information contained in the charts.’  Numerical scoring reduces, but 
does not eliminate, subjectivity.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 149 Id. at 909-10, 922. 
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III. WHY FMRI SHOULD BE ADMITTED BASED ON THE 
EVIDENTIARY DOCTRINE 
A. The Daubert Analysis 
1. Basic Doctrine 
Until recently, polygraphs were generally inadmissible 
at trial.150  In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, in Frye v. United States, determined that 
any scientific theory that was not sufficiently accepted in the 
scientific community should not be admissible in court.151  
Because this landmark case on scientific evidence centered on 
polygraph evidence and the Court determined that the 
technique did not meet this standard, the polygraph test was 
dealt a serious blow from which it has never recovered.152  Even 
though the Court made clear that the polygraph was not 
admissible because it was not “sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance,”153 and not because of an inherent 
flaw in the science, little re-examination was done over the 
years to determine whether the level of acceptance had 
improved.154  
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,155 however, changed the 
landscape of scientific evidence admissibility that in turn 
affected the polygraph analysis.156  The Court held that “the 
Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence,”157 and that Rule 702 now governs expert evidence 
without reference to Frye’s “general acceptance” doctrine.158  
The Court also pointed to the Federal Rules’ pervasive “‘liberal 
thrust [in] . . . relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion 
testimony.’”159  From these two indications, the Court 
  
 150 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 311 n.7 (1998).  See also Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 40:1; 
Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 900-01. 
 151 293 F. at 1014. 
 152 Jodi Meyers, Lee v. Martinez: Does Polygraph Evidence Really Satisfy 
Daubert?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 391, 393-94 (2006). 
 153 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 154 Meyers, supra note 152, at 393. 
 155 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 156 Meyers, supra note 152, at 393-94. 
 157 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
 158 Id. at 588. 
 159 Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). 
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concluded, “[t]hat [Frye’s] austere standard, absent from, and 
incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be 
applied in federal trials.”160 
The Court, however, also interpreted Rule 702 to 
provide trial judges with a significant gate-keeping function: 
“[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific 
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but 
reliable.”161  Before discussing the Frye test, the Court discussed 
the definition of scientific knowledge: 
The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and 
procedures of science.  Similarly, the word “knowledge” connotes 
more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.  The term 
“applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred 
from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.”162 
The Court went on to acknowledge that assertions of a 
scientific theory need not be “‘known’ to a certainty” because 
“arguably, there are no certainties in science.”163  However, 
testimony must “be derived by the scientific method . . . [and] 
supported by appropriate validation.”164 
The Court did not entirely turn its back on Frye.  
Rather, it held that a trial judge may look at the theory’s 
general acceptance as one of many factors in determining 
whether to admit testimony based on a scientific theory or 
technique.165  These other factors include but are not limited to: 
whether the theory or technique can be tested, whether it “has 
been subjected to peer review and publication,” “the known or 
potential rate of error,” and “the existence and maintenance of 
standards controlling.”166  Rule 702 was modified after Daubert 
  
 160 Id. at 589. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 590 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)). 
 163 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.  
 164 Id.  (“In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to 
‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.”). 
 165 Id. at 594. 
 166 Id. at 593-94.  Other factors trial judges have considered include:  
(1) Whether experts . . . have developed their opinions expressly for purposes 
of testifying [in the case]. . . . (2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably 
extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion. . . . 
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative 
explanations. . . . (4) Whether the expert is being as careful as he would be in 
his regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting. 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes (quotations omitted). 
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to codify the trial judge’s new gate keeping function.167  Under 
the federal rule, the judge may exclude testimony that is not 
“the product of reliable principles and methods.”168  Under Rule 
702, the court has considerable discretion169 in its rationale for 
deciding that expert testimony is reliable and relevant to the 
matter at issue.170  Furthermore, during discussion of Rule 403 
which requires a court to exclude evidence when its prejudicial 
effect substantially outweighs its probative value, the Court 
warned: “‘Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite 
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.  Because of 
this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against 
probative force under Rule 403 . . . exercises more control over 
experts than over lay witnesses.’”171 
The trial courts, however, have so embraced the gate-
keeping function that the liberalizing aspirations172 of the 
Daubert opinion have been thwarted.173  Since Daubert, more 
parties have sought exclusion of scientific evidence and more 
have succeeded.174  In addition, judges have been examining 
scientific evidence more rigorously and excluding a larger 
percentage of it.175  At least one study shows that making 
general acceptance merely one of several factors failed to lessen 
this criterion as a bar to admissibility.176  Perhaps the 
additional factors merely increased grounds upon which judges 
might exclude evidence, because if a piece of evidence appeared 
  
 167 FED. R. EVID. 702 (amended in 2000). 
 168 Id.  The Court may still exclude testimony in which the testimony is not 
“based upon sufficient facts or data,” or if “the witness has [poorly] applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case.”  Id. 
 169 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (holding that 
the “trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to 
go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable”). 
 170 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
 171 Id. at 595 (citing 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (S.D. Ga. 1991)). 
 172 See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in 
a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1316 (2004). 
 173 Vickers, supra note 32, at 110. (“Daubert, as applied by judges, has 
heightened the bar for admissibility and, accordingly, reduced the proportion of 
evidence deemed admissible.”).   
 174 Id. at 109-10.  A 2001 RAND Corporation study concluded that twenty 
percent more evidentiary challenges were successful in the years after Daubert than 
prior to the decision.  1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:34. 
 175 Christina L. Studebaker et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, 
and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 309, 330 (2002). 
 176 Press Release, RAND Corporation, Federal District Judges are Screening 
Expert Evidence More Strictly (Nov. 29, 2001), http://www.rand.org/news/Press/ 
expert.html.  
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to be weak under any factor, a judge could justify exclusion.177  
Academics have also pushed courts “to re-evaluate existing 
presumptions about expert admissibility.”178  Regarding 
polygraphs, one scholar argues, “growing evidence indicates 
that the proffered expert testimony is reliable, and Daubert has 
given courts the opportunity[,] if not the duty,” to broach the 
issue anew.179 
In the wake of Daubert, the courts were again “forced to 
address polygraph evidence.”180  If the courts are free to 
consider the polygraph’s other attributes, perhaps motivated 
counsel could take on the court’s seemingly forgone conclusion 
that the test was not generally accepted in the scientific 
community.  Furthermore, counsel may also have judged that 
the watershed case and the more open-ended language within 
it might permit a re-tooled argument for the polygraph’s recent 
general acceptance. 
Nearly half of the circuit courts have re-evaluated 
polygraphs after Daubert.181  In United States v. Posado,182 the 
Fifth Circuit considered the Daubert factors and held open the 
possibility that the polygraph could satisfy Rule 702 in some 
circumstances, although it did not in the case before it.  The 
court first noted that the polygraph test had grown more 
sophisticated since Frye, now with “modern instrumentation” 
measuring more than just blood pressure.183  The court asserted 
that the error rate was measurable and attributable to a 
  
 177 Vickers, supra note 32, at 120-21 (Using “multi-factored tests . . . is too 
flexible and leaves too much discretion in the [judge’s] hands. . . . Its application is 
likely to produce inconsistent, arbitrary, and unpredictable results.”). 
 178 Ric Simmons, Conquering the Province of the Jury: Expert Testimony and 
the Professionalization of Fact-Finding, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1013, 1046 (2006). 
 179 Id.  See Ronald L. Carlson, Navigating the Nuances of Modern Expert 
Witness Law: How to Teach About Experts, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115, 1128 (2006) 
(“Daubert asks courts and scholars to review formerly rejected technical processes to 
determine if their rejection is based upon unreliability of the process, or if it simply 
results from the inherent conservatism of the law.” (emphasis added)). 
 180 Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 903. 
 181 See Simmons, supra note 178, at 1042-43 (citing United States v. Gilliard, 
133 F.3d 809 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402 (10th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Beyer, 106 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cordoba, 
104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding per se ban overturned by Daubert); United 
States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 728-30 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Posado, 57 
F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 182 57 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 183 Id. at 434.  While this observation about sophistication does not seem to fit 
in to any of the Daubert inquiries, it seems to play a role in the court’s analysis.  When 
Judge Jed Rakoff expressed his hesitancies about the new technology, he acknowledged 
his regard for the underlying science.  Ireland, supra note 18. 
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minimum number of factors.184  Furthermore, according to the 
court, the error rate lay between 70% and 90%, a variation that 
“exists in many of the disciplines and for much of the scientific 
evidence we routinely find admissible under Rule 702.”185  
Finally, increased standardization, peer review, testing, and 
general acceptance outside the courtroom all influenced the 
court to decide that the test is permissible under Daubert.186  
The Ninth Circuit has also held that Daubert overruled 
the per se ban on polygraph evidence, and it instructed the 
lower court to do a Daubert analysis.187  The lower court 
conducted an extensive two-day hearing on the polygraph, 
however, and found that the polygraph did not pass the 
Daubert test.188  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that “the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
‘polygraph evidence does not presently satisfy the Daubert 
standards.’”189  The Tenth Circuit has likewise determined that 
Daubert applied to polygraphs, but stated that the lower court’s 
Daubert analysis did not abuse discretion in finding that 
“nothing in Daubert would disturb the settled precedent that 
polygraph evidence is neither reliable nor admissible to show 
that one is truthful.”190  The Fourth Circuit has continued to 
apply a ban, but has discussed at length an inclination to soon 
employ a Daubert analysis to polygraphs.191   
One circuit court simply avoided the question of 
polygraph admissibility.192  Two years after Daubert, the Second 
Circuit affirmed a lower court’s exclusion of polygraph evidence 
under Rule 403 based on the problematic nature of the 
polygraph questions posed to the defendant.193  The court found 
  
 184 “Remaining controversy about test accuracy is almost unanimously 
attributed to variations in the integrity of the testing environment and the 
qualifications of the examiner.”  Posado, 57 F.3d at 436.  
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 188 United States v. Cordoba, 991 F.Supp. 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“The court 
finds polygraphy has not achieved general acceptance in the scientific community for 
courtroom use, the error rate for real-life polygraph tests is unknown, and there are no 
controlling standards for polygraphy.”), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 189 United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted).  
 190 United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 191 United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1999).  See also Ligons, supra note 83, 
at 218 n.76 (summary of states that employ a per se ban).  
 192 United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 193 Id. 
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the test results irrelevant because three questions were not 
sufficiently and precisely tailored to the issues of the case.194  
The court did not rely on Rule 702 because “the record . . . 
simply d[id] not provide the proper opportunity to explore the 
validity of polygraph evidence under Rule 702.”195   
The Supreme Court most recently addressed polygraph 
admissibility in 1998 and held that a per se rule excluding 
polygraph evidence for criminal defendants was 
constitutional.196  The case involved Military Rule of Evidence 
707(a), which bans polygraph evidence from court-martial 
proceedings.197  The Court found that there was “no consensus 
that polygraph evidence is reliable”198 and that disagreement in 
lower courts emphasized the controversy.199  The Court held 
that it was not arbitrary for the President (who dictates 
military law) to deem polygraphs unreliable given the 
widespread disagreement regarding accuracy.200  Thus, the 
exclusion of the polygraph evidence was based on legitimate 
reasons, despite a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
compulsory process.201   
In a part of his opinion supported only by a minority, 
Justice Thomas added that “preserving the court members[’] 
role in determining credibility . . . and avoiding litigation that 
is collateral to the primary purpose of the trial” also support 
exclusion.202  In the opinion of the Court, Daubert did not 
prohibit a ban on a particular form of scientific evidence:203  
“[T]here is simply no way to know in a particular case whether 
a polygraph examiner’s conclusion is accurate, because certain 
doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph 
exams.”204  United States v. Scheffer dealt a significant blow to 
polygraphs both because it has been interpreted as finding 
  
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 669. 
 196 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 305 (1998). 
 197 Id. at 306-07. 
 198 Id. at 309. 
 199 Id. at 310-11. 
 200 Id. at 312. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309. 
 203 Id. at 311 n.7. 
 204 Id. at 312 (“We cannot say, then, that presented with such widespread 
uncertainty, the President acted arbitrarily or disproportionately in promulgating a per 
se rule excluding all polygraph evidence.”).  Justice Thomas also justifies the Court’s 
decision on the Province of the Jury doctrine.  Id. at 312-15.  See also infra Part III.D. 
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polygraphs inaccurate and as revitalizing the polygraph’s 
Province of the Jury concern.205   
Thus, many courts have acknowledged that Daubert 
mandated re-examining polygraph evidence.  The new analysis, 
however, has been no more welcoming of the technology. 
2. Applying Daubert to fMRI Lie Detection 
At some point in the near future, if not at present, a 
reasonable doctrinal analysis should allow fMRI lie-detection 
technology to be admissible in court.  Many of the Daubert 
factors can be met, and, given an appropriate (albeit limited) 
set of circumstances, the evidence would be relevant under 
Rule 403 and sufficiently outside the narrow Province of the 
Jury.  Furthermore, the technology, though young, tests better 
than commonly permitted evidence. 
a. Testability/Falsifiability 
The first Daubert factor, testability (or falsifiability), 
requires that one be able to verify that the same test performed 
the same way will lead to consistent results.  While many 
believe further testing is required, at some point in the near 
future, a court could reasonably find that fMRI’s are testable.  
Scholars interpret this factor to mean whether a scientific 
theory has been tested and is capable of being tested in the 
future.206  Daubert requires judges “to distinguish the methods 
of science from those methods that merely imitate science.”207  
While the Supreme Court did not indicate how trial courts 
should determine testability,208 in practice, courts tend to 
require testability rather than weigh it as one of many 
factors.209  One scholar has suggested that “a judge must find 
that the general principles and theories underlying an expert’s 
opinion are reliable and valid.  This responsibility includes an 
evaluation of the methodology used to make a specific inference 
  
 205 At least one scholar disapproves of the revitalization.  Bush, supra note 23, 
at 552 (“Multiple federal circuit courts cited the decision as approving of per se rules 
against polygraph admissibility as well as for the general proposition that polygraph 
evidence is unreliable.  The Seventh Circuit even misconstrued Scheffer to stand for the 
proposition that courts should exclude polygraph evidence because it infringes on the 
jury’s responsibilities.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 206 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:15.  
 207 Id. § 1:16.   
 208 Id. § 1:15.   
 209 Id. 
2007] fMRI LIE DETECTION 1377 
since the validity of such methodologies . . . depend[s] on 
general principles and theories.”210  
The fMRI technology is capable of being tested because 
(1) the procedure is repeatable and (2) the results can be 
validated, at least in a clinical setting.211  Any number of 
subjects can be submitted to precisely the same technology, and 
results may be analyzed by a single computer algorithm.  
Because three aspects of the fMRI exam are more automated 
than the traditional polygraph exam, a court should find the 
fMRI to be a more “testable” technology.212   
First, the questions during an fMRI are presented to the 
subject on a computer screen and not by a human interviewer.  
One major flaw in testing polygraphs is that some interviewers 
are better than others.  What a polygraph exam measures is 
the subject’s precise physiological reaction during question and 
answer.213  Nervousness, stress, anxiety, and fear inform one’s 
psycho-physiological reaction.214  Therefore, how the question is 
asked and who the examiner is affect the test results.215  For 
example, the examiner’s tone of voice, intonation, attitude, 
physical posture, and eye contact may all lead one subject to be 
more nervous than if the interrogator were to ask the question 
differently.216  Moreover, an examiner’s bias might cause the 
examiner to use subtle techniques to bring about a particular 
result.217 
Second, the fMRI presents the questions in a random 
order.  While this is thought to be helpful in thwarting 
  
 210 Id § 1:17. (“If a body of data supports both valid generalizations and the 
methods employed to determine specific propositions, the jury should evaluate what 
weight to accord the testimony. . . . In short, judges should evaluate under Rule 104(a) 
the general principles or methods by which experts derive their opinions about specific 
causation. . . . [O]nce the court has determined that [such] methods are sufficiently 
valid and that they were employed in the particular case, the trier of fact must assess 
the weight the evidence receives.”). 
 211 Id. § 1:15.  However, it is difficult to test the technology under real-world 
conditions because real-world incentives, such as avoiding prison or receiving a 
windfall, are hard to mimic and may affect a subject’s cognitive activity far beyond an 
imposed clinical incentive.   
 212 In both the fMRI and the polygraph exams the particular practitioner 
composes the questions. 
 213 Willing, supra note 11, at 5A. 
 214 See supra text accompanying notes 79-83. 
 215 See supra text accompanying notes 85-88. 
 216 A base line reading is taken during a polygraph so that any overarching 
anxiety or intimidation from the exam itself or the interrogator may be taken into 
account.  See supra text accompanying note 85. 
 217 See supra text accompanying note 88. 
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countermeasures,218 it also standardizes the exam.  Any 
strategy employed in the sequencing of questioning would have 
to be tested.  If every facility employed a different strategy, 
each strategy would have to be tested.  Furthermore, the 
strategy would be hard to specify given the variety of fact 
patterns and, thus, would make the technique especially hard 
to test for accuracy.  
Third, the fMRI results are interpreted by a computer 
algorithm, whereas traditional polygraphs require the 
examiner to interpret the test results.  Error, in a polygraph 
analysis, may result from mistake or bias.219  There is concern 
even from within the polygraph community regarding the 
proper training of examiners.220  Additionally, any examiner is 
subject to personal feelings and may be influenced by his 
subjective impressions.221  Since it is interpreted by a computer, 
the fMRI is less susceptible to “confirmation bias.”222  The 
computer first does a number of preliminary tasks such as 
correcting for small head movements that affect picture 
quality.223  Then, the computer determines which brain regions 
  
 218 This is all highly speculative because little research has been done 
regarding fMRI countermeasures.  However, one underlying principle of fMRI lie 
detection is that people have an initial impulse to tell the truth, which must be 
suppressed in order to concoct and tell a lie.  If there were some particularly 
imaginative or deceptive state that one could maintain during an exam that would 
lessen the initial truthful impulse, the random question order would presumably make 
this more difficult to keep up.  See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 4:21-24, 22:14-
23:3.  The subject does not know whether the upcoming questions are going to pertain 
to the lie or to some innocuous subject (used to establish baseline readings, such as “Is 
your name Bob?”) that would require a truthful answer.  See id. at 20:23-21:13. 
 219 “Remaining controversy about [polygraph] test accuracy is almost 
unanimously attributed to variations in the integrity of the testing environment and 
the qualifications of the examiner.”  United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 
1995). 
 220 Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 923 (“the [Department of 
Defense, Polygraph Institute] trains all federal polygraph examiners.  It ‘is the only 
program known to base its curriculum on forensic psychophysiology, and conceptual, 
abstract, and applied knowledge that meet the requirements of a master’s degree-level 
of study.’  The qualifications standards include a college degree (or equivalent), two 
years’ experience as an investigator, and a six-month internship . . . . In addition, 80 
hours of continuing instruction are required annually.  Outside of federally trained 
examiners, few have such qualifications.” (citations omitted)). 
 221 It is important to note that subjective determinations are routinely 
permitted in expert evidence such as fingerprint analyses, toolmark evidence, and 
handwriting identification.  Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship 
Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 982 n.146 
(2006). 
 222 See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Challenges to Fingerprints, 42 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 5 (2006) (“a well-established phenomenon that is frequently ignored in forensic 
work”).  
 223 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 55:9-16. 
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were activated during each question.224  A simple comparison of 
area activation across control and non-control questions 
indicates deception because it directly correlates to the added 
mental effort involved.225  A well-tested computer program is 
likely to interpret results more reliably than a single 
practitioner.226 
b. Peer Review and Publication 
The Supreme Court noted that peer review and 
publication is a factor to consider in determining whether a 
particular scientific method is worthy of admission under FRE 
702.227   The Court suggests that peer reviewed publications 
indicate that the scientific principles have been subjected to 
scientific scrutiny by those best suited to judge their 
legitimacy.228  Even publications that are not peer reviewed are 
helpful towards a Daubert analysis because they disseminate 
the ideas to the scientific community who may then seek to 
challenge or confirm the results.229  The Supreme Court found, 
however, that the scientific theory need not be beyond 
reproach.  Flaws detected during peer review “do not 
necessarily equate to a lack of scientific validity,” but may 
simply affect the testimony’s weight.230   
When the Sixth Circuit considered the admissibility of 
DNA evidence soon after Daubert, the government produced six 
publications, each dealing with a specific aspect of DNA 
technology.  The court also considered the extensive 
publications on DNA matching and the “general procedures 
  
 224 See supra Part II.A. 
 225 See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 40:10-12, 43:2-24. 
 226 Question composition is not done by a machine and may present a variable.  
In real-world situations, it is much more difficult to determine whether a statement is 
actually true or false.  Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 912.  
Furthermore, while the fMRI has been tested by several teams of scientists, critics may 
point out that most of these scientists have commercial interest in the technology.  See 
supra note 125. 
 227 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993); United 
States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 559 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding DNA evidence admissible 
under Daubert). 
 228 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; Bonds, 12 F.3d at 559.  To be published in a 
true peer review scientific journal, authors submit work, receive comments from the 
journal’s outside scientists who evaluate the results, and make appropriate changes 
sufficient to satisfy the journal’s editors.  Id. at 559 n.16. 
 229 “[S]ubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of 
‘good science,’ in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in 
methodology will be detected.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 230 Id. at 593-94; Bonds, 12 F.3d at 559. 
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used to come up with the forensic results” as further evidence 
of peer review.231  Even though some of the publications offered 
by the prosecution were not technically peer reviewed scientific 
journals, the court acknowledged their value in exposing the 
procedures to the larger scientific community.232  
The fMRI scholarship on deception has been subjected 
to peer review and published in scholarly journals in at least 
twenty instances.233  All twenty articles have been published 
within the last six years, and five have come out since the 
beginning of 2006.  Even if a test case is only one or two years 
away, by that time there will likely be even more publications 
available. 
  
 231 Bonds, 12 F.3d at 560. 
 232 Id. at 559 n.16. 
 233 See generally Nobuhito Abe et al., Deceiving Others: Distinct Neural 
Responses of the Prefrontal Cortex and Amygdala in Simple Fabrication and Deception 
with Social Interactions, 19 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 287 (2007); C. Davatzikos et 
al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine Learning Methods: 
Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663 (2005); M. Gamer et al., Covariations 
Among fMRI, Skin Conductance, and Behavioral Data During Processing of Concealed 
Information, 28 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING ___ (forthcoming 2007); G. Ganis et al., Neural 
Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 
830 (2003); N.J. Gordon et al., Integrated Zone Comparison Polygraph Technique 
Accuracy with Scoring Algorithms, 87 PHYSIOLOGY BEHAV. 251 (2006); Kozel et al., 
Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605; F. Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy 
Young Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 295 (2004); Kozel, et 
al., Neural Correlates of Deception, supra note 47, at 852; Daniel D. Langleben et al., 
Telling Truth From Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 
HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262 (2005); D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During 
Simulated Deception: An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 
NEUROIMAGE 727 (2002); Tatia M. Lee et al., Neural Correlates of Feigned Memory 
Impairment, 28 NEUROIMAGE 305 (2005); Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 157 (2002); 
Donald H. Marks et al., Determination of Truth from Deception Using Functional MRI 
and Cognitive Engrams, 5 INTERNET J. RADIOLOGY (2006), 
http://www.ispub.com/ostia/index.php?xmlFilePath =journals/ijra/vol5n1/engram.xml; 
Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling About an 
Ecologically Valid Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation—
Initial Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679, 679 (2006); J. M. Nunez et al., Intentional 
False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive 
Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE 267 (2005); K. Luan Phan et al., Neural Correlates of Telling 
Lies: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study at 4 Tesla, 12 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 
164 (2005); Sean A. Spence et al., A Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception: 
Evidence From Functional Neuroimaging, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL 
SOC’Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1755 (2004); Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and 
Functional Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEURO REPORT 2849 
(2001); Donald T. Stuss et al., The Frontal Lobes Are Necessary for ‘Theory of Mind,’ 
124 BRAIN 279 (2001); Yaling Yang et al., Prefrontal White Matter in Pathological 
Liars, 187 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 320 (2005).  This list does not include publications in 
scientific journals on the bioethics and legal implications of fMRI lie-detection efforts. 
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Furthermore, the science that underlies fMRI lie 
detection has been subjected to rigorous peer-evaluation by the 
larger scientific community.234  Many of the nation’s leading 
institutions have become centers for both fMRI tests and brain-
mapping—these technologies were not only scrutinized in the 
past, but they serve as the foundation for a broad, new frontier 
of study.235  Scientists are using fMRI technology to understand 
from where in the brain a disabled person’s seizures emanate, 
to steer clear of important neurological regions during brain 
surgery, to better promote stroke recovery, and to diagnose pre-
symptom Alzheimer’s.236  Each of these fMRI applications has 
been subjected to peer reviewed publication.237  If the court 
finds publications on fMRI lie detection too sparse,238 it might 
consider publication on other aspects of the same technology.  
As the admission of DNA evidence indicates, technology 
spawned by major scientific fields carries considerable weight.   
c. Error Rate 
The Daubert Court listed error rate as a consideration 
for admissibility of scientific evidence.239  Several fMRI studies 
have produced error rates for determining whether a subject 
was telling a truth or falsehood.  The largest study yielded an 
error rate of only 7% to 10%.240  While the Supreme Court did 
not specify what error rates would be acceptable,241 this error-
  
 234 Ongoing peer-evaluation, the scrutiny of the entire scientific community, 
occurs post-publication and is distinct from the limited peer review done prior to 
publication in a journal.  
 235 The Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Center at Columbia 
University and the Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging at Harvard 
University are two of the centers engaged in a wide variety of fMRI studies.  See 
Columbia University, Columbia Functional MRI Research Center, http://www.fmri.org/ 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007); Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, 
http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/martinos/flashHome.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).  
See also The fMRI Data Center, http://www.fmridc.org/f/fmridc (maintained by 
Dartmouth College) (last visited Mar. 30, 2007); Funcational Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging, http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fmri_intro/fmri_intro.php (maintained by Oxford 
University) (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
 236 Parry & Matthews, supra note 36.   
 237 Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605. 
 238 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) 
(acknowledging “[s]ome propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too 
limited interest to be published.”). 
 239 Id. at 594. 
 240 Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605. 
 241 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:20. 
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rate is certainly helpful to the jury.242  Moreover, this error-rate 
is more calculable than that of many other types of admissible 
forensic evidence, including fingerprint analyses, for which 
there is “surprisingly little conventional science . . . to support 
the claims of the fingerprint examination community,”243 and 
firearm identification.244  Furthermore, it should be noted that 
ordinary eyewitness testimony245 is routinely presented to 
juries despite problematic error rates—it is the leading cause of 
false convictions.246  Therefore, a scientifically measurable error 
rate of approximately 10% should not disqualify fMRI 
evidence.247  
Justice Blackmun specified that “the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s 
operation” should also be a factor in judging a technology.248  
The computerization of the fMRI test allows considerable 
standardization.249  The presentation of the questions, the speed 
at which they are administered, and the timing of the MRI 
imaging can all be administered, monitored, and analyzed by a 
  
 242 FED. R. EVID. 702.  Any evidence that is better than chance is presumably 
helpful. 
 243 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 34:1 (“Today, a thoughtful and 
scientifically literate proponent of expert fingerprint identification testimony, 
compelled . . . to demonstrate the validity of fingerprint identification claims in front of 
a thoughtful and scientifically literate judge, would face a number of serious 
difficulties. . . . Proficiency testing does not support the claimed error rate of zero or of 
the unanimity of opinion asserted by fingerprint examiners.” (citations omitted)).  One 
“court found that ‘[e]ven allowing for the possibility of individual error, the error rate 
with latent print identification is vanishingly small when it is subject to fair 
adversarial testing and challenge.’”  Id. § 1:29 (quoting U.S. v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 
2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000)).  However, “[t]he court never explained how it knew this 
to be so.”  Id. 
 244 See Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and 
Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
1, 24-25 (2005) (“[I]t is questionable whether a meaningful error rate for the subjective 
method of firearms and toolmark examination can even be calculated.  Proficiency tests 
may indicate particular examiners’ ability to reach correct identity conclusions at a 
given time.  However, unless examiners commit themselves to specific, articulable 
criteria for determining when the resemblances between toolmarks are so great that 
they must have come from the same tool, a given examiner’s proficiency at a certain 
time is no guarantee of similar proficiency in the future.” (footnote omitted)). 
 245 An eyewitness’s testimony is not considered expert evidence and therefore 
avoids a Daubert analysis. 
 246 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:34. 
 247 Some argue that the error rate of a technology that goes directly to 
credibility should be more stringent than for other types of evidence.  See infra Part 
III.B.2. 
 248 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
 249 See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 48:3-16. 
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software package.250  A voxel count, which indicates the extent 
of the blood oxygenation, is also numeric and could thus be 
standardized.251 
d. General Acceptance 
Despite overruling Frye, the Court kept “general 
acceptance” a factor in determining admissibility of scientific 
evidence.252  Here, fMRI lie detection would probably stumble 
because the technology is new and rather shocking.  
Nevertheless the fMRI technology used in this technique might 
still be seen as generally accepted by scientists because it is 
used so extensively at the highest levels of various medical 
research fields.  While this is not an explicit consideration 
under Daubert, it does seem to affect judges because one of 
Daubert’s principles was to exclude “junk science.”253  The Three 
Tesla magnetic resonance imaging machines working in 
concert with intricate computer algorithms and cutting-edge 
brain-mapping all produced by scientists associated with such 
institutions as Columbia University, the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, and Harvard University seem a far cry 
from snake oil. 
B. Other Rules 
1. Applying Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to fMRI Lie-
Detection Technology  
Even if a court finds that polygraphs satisfy Daubert 
and Rule 702, the test is vulnerable to a Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 analysis.254  Rule 403 allows a trial judge to 
exclude evidence when its prejudicial effect outweighs its 
probative value.255  The prejudicial effect could come from 
“unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
  
 250 See id. at 15:25-16:8, 48:14-49:11 (comparing this to events in the famous 
Wen Ho Lee spy scandal in which two government agencies disagreed about the 
subject’s polygraph results). 
 251 Id. at 38:16-20. 
 252 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 253 Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1083, 1097 (2006). 
 254 United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 255 FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”). 
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jury.”256  For example, jurors might overvalue polygraph results 
despite warnings of the test’s limited accuracy, or the court 
may determine that the evidence’s reliability (or lack thereof) 
could simply confuse or mislead the jury.  In either case, the 
court could exclude the evidence under Rule 403. 
While fMRI evidence is also subject to an error rate and 
might be overvalued by the fact-finder, the same could be said 
for many admissible forms of evidence such as fingerprint 
evidence, toolmark analysis, and eyewitness testimony.257  The 
vividness of some of the fMRI images might lead a trial judge 
to be more concerned with prejudice because any false sense of 
familiarity with the science could increase the evidence’s undue 
prejudice.258  However, it is difficult to justify such an exclusion 
given the opportunity to cross-examine.  In addition, 
eyewitness testimony, which is routinely admitted, is similarly 
powerful evidence and subject to substantial error.  The jury is 
simply trusted to weigh the testimony accordingly.  Therefore, 
while courts might use Rule 403 to exclude fMRI results 
because the error rates are confusing or the technology is too 
seductive, there are few distinct characteristics of fMRI 
evidence to warrant the exclusion.  Any such decision may 
more readily suggest a court’s vague uneasiness with this 
“mind reading” technology rather than a specific prejudice.259  
2. Applying the “Province of the Jury” Doctrine to fMRI 
Lie-Detection Technology 
Even if the judge determines that testimony is 
admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403, the 
offering party may face an objection that lie-detection 
  
 256 Id.  Courts have found that polygraphs fail a 403 analysis for this reason.  
See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 257 See supra text accompanying notes 244, 280-83. 
 258 Jennifer Mnookin argues that one reason fingerprint evidence is so 
powerful is because the jury can see the evidence for itself.  Jennifer L. Mnookin, 
Fingerprint Evidence in the Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 26-27 (2001) 
(“[T]he fingerprints themselves, as much as the expert opinion about the fingerprints, 
seem to constitute the evidence.”).   
 259 The next section will separately address the Province of the Jury doctrine 
although courts sometimes deal with this under a 403 analysis.  See United States v. 
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 314 (1998) (finding that “jurisdictions may legitimately 
determine that the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to 
abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt”); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 
225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that “polygraph evidence has grave potential for 
interfering with the deliberative process”). 
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testimony invades the Province of the Jury.260  For the last 150 
years, the Province of the Jury doctrine has kept witnesses 
from testifying about their own inferences and opinions unless 
they arose from a specialized skill that would aid the jury in its 
decision.261  The reasoning stemmed from the notion that the 
jurors ought to use their own opinions and inferences to make a 
decision and that third party opinion testimony might cloud the 
jury’s perspective.262  The courts recognized that jurors still 
needed expert advice in fields such as engineering, medicine, or 
business to “enable [them] to draw conclusions from the facts 
more accurately.”263  However, over time, courts have 
increasingly permitted expert evidence in more areas.264  
Presently, “experts have gained the right to assist the jury on 
almost every issue.”265   
One major fear in allowing lie detectors into court 
proceedings is that they will take away from the jury its role as 
fact-finder, specifically in the witness-credibility arena.266  One 
might argue that a jury will no longer have to watch a witness 
testify, hunt for deceptive behavior, and decide whether or not 
to believe the witness, because the fMRI will indicate who is 
lying and who is not.267  Some might even imagine that many 
  
 260 See Simmons, supra note 178, at 1019, 1032 (discussion of court’s similar 
treatment of eyewitness experts: “Courts generally cited one of two reasons for 
precluding the testimony: either the expert could not provide any information beyond 
what could be provided by cross-examination and the jurors’ common sense (and 
therefore the testimony was not helpful), or the proffered testimony impermissibly 
infringed on the jury’s traditional role of determining credibility.”). 
 261 Id. at 1018-19. 
 262 Id. at 1019. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. at 1015. 
 265 Id.  See also Carlson, supra note 179, at 1126-27 (“An expert on mental 
states of accused persons cannot categorically announce that the defendant had the 
mens rea to commit a specific crime.  Nor may an expert invade the province of the jury 
in a civil or criminal case.  She does so, among other ways, by attempting to testify that 
a testator lacked mental capacity to sign a will, in a will contest case.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 266 Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 916. 
 267 Justice Thomas wrote:  
Jurisdictions, in promulgating rules of evidence, may legitimately be 
concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive weight to the opinions 
of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise and at times 
offering, as in respondent’s case, a conclusion about the ultimate issue in the 
trial.  Such jurisdictions may legitimately determine that the aura of 
infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to abandon their 
duty to assess credibility and guilt.  Those jurisdictions may also take into 
account the fact that a judge cannot determine, when ruling on a motion to 
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trials, specifically those revolving around which party is telling 
the truth, might not require a jury at all—simply have the 
parties or witnesses submit to an fMRI exam.268  While the 
Province of the Jury doctrine has eroded as reliance on expert 
testimony has grown, courts have most strongly guarded the 
jury’s witness credibility task.269  Despite arguments that there 
is reasonable justification for such effort,270 the fMRI will not 
take credibility determination from the jury, nor will it greatly 
alter the trial process as it stands today.271  Rather, fMRI 
evidence will help the jury determine who is telling the truth, 
but at the same time require juries (as they often must) to 
parse various reasons why proffered evidence may not be 
convincing in a particular case.272 
There has been much confusion273 and controversy274 
surrounding the Province of the Jury concerns.  Nevertheless, 
courts regularly cite the doctrine with respect to credibility 
testimony.275  Some scholars argue that exclusion of credibility 
testimony on Province of the Jury grounds is inappropriate.276  
First, many courts found that Rule 704 implicitly abolished the 
Province of the Jury doctrine along with explicitly rejecting the 
“Ultimate Issue” principle.277  In United States v. Scheffer, 
Justice Kennedy discussed Rule 704 and professed he “had 
thought this tired [Province of the Jury] argument had long 
since been given its deserved repose as a categorical rule of 
  
admit polygraph evidence, whether a particular polygraph expert is likely to 
influence the jury unduly. 
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1998). 
 268 The constitutional right to a trial by jury would, of course, prohibit such a 
procedure.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 269 Simmons, supra note 178, at 1029. 
 270 See infra note 281 and accompanying text. 
 271 Pardo, supra note 10, at 305. 
 272 This may, however, lead to the problematic battle of the experts.  See, e.g., 
Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 684-85 (2001) (“in which hired 
guns clash with opposing opinions, neither of which is any more empirically 
supportable than the other”). 
 273 See Simmons, supra note 178, at 1020 & n.39. 
 274 Wigmore argued that excluding evidence based on Province of the Jury had 
no merit.  Id. at 1020, 1022. 
 275 Ironically, some confusion over the term comes from charges of judges 
invading the Province of the Jury by excluding evidence the jury should hear.  Id.   
 276 Id. at 1015-16. 
 277 Id. at 1033 n.107.  See FED. R. EVID. 704(a) (“[T]estimony in the form of an 
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”). 
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exclusion.”278  He also referred to it as “outmoded,” and quoted 
Wigmore’s characterization of the doctrine as “‘empty 
rhetoric.’”279   
Furthermore, courts have begun to accept eyewitness 
expert testimony regarding the accuracy of a witness’s 
identification.280  State and Federal courts have found such 
expert evidence “‘helpful’”281 under Rule 702 and distinguished 
the evidence sufficiently from the Province of the Jury.282  The 
rationale some courts were using to let in these experts could 
be argued to apply equally to polygraph examiners.283  
However, in Scheffer, Justice Thomas employed the 
doctrine regarding polygraphs:284 
By its very nature, polygraph evidence may diminish the jury’s role 
in making credibility determinations.  The common form of 
polygraph test measures a variety of physiological responses to a set 
of questions asked by the examiner, who then interprets these 
physiological correlates of anxiety and offers an opinion to the jury 
about whether the witness—often, as in this case, the accused—was 
deceptive in answering questions about the very matters at issue in 
the trial.  Unlike other expert witnesses who testify about factual 
matters outside the jurors’ knowledge, such as the analysis of 
fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph 
expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to 
its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth.285  
Scholar Louise A. Jacobs argues that Thomas’s opinion 
advances the Province of the Jury argument in flagrant 
disregard of Daubert and thus encourages abandoning a 
  
 278 523 U.S. 303, 319 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 279 Id. 
 280 Simmons, supra note 178, at 1032-34 (one court dismissing the Province of 
the Jury doctrine as “‘no more than a shibboleth’”).  See Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral 
Science in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 891 
(2005) (“[T]he frequent exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification 
despite its scientific reliability, contrasting sharply with the widespread admission of 
evidence of such dubious reliability as ‘future dangerousness’ and the various 
syndromes discussed above, strongly suggests that factors other than reliability are 
playing the determinative role.”). 
 281 Simmons, supra note 178, at 1034. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. at 1032-34.  One “court found that the testimony would ‘assist the trier 
of fact’ because ‘[w]e cannot assume that the average juror would be aware of the 
variables concerning identification and memory about which [the expert] was qualified 
to testify.”  Id. at 1033.  Another wrote “although ‘personal experience and intuition’ 
can guide jurors in assessing witness credibility, ‘other factors bearing on eyewitness 
identification may be known only to some jurors, or may be imperfectly understood by 
many, or may be contrary to the intuitive beliefs of most.’”  Id. at 1033-34. 
 284 Albeit with only minority support. 
 285 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (citations omitted). 
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rigorous reliability and relevance inquiry while reviving a 
facile, unpersuasive, antiquated reasoning.286  The adversary 
process, she argues, as it exists today—with in limine and 
Daubert hearings, as well as discovery, voir dire, and jury 
instructions—is well suited to allow experts to discuss issues 
that touch on a case’s ultimate issues.287 
One weakness in Justice Thomas’ assertion is that 
studies have shown that people are not good at determining 
anothers’ truthfulness.288  Second, distinguishing in this aspect 
between the evidence presented by a fingerprint analyst and a 
polygraph examiner is delicate indeed.  Granted, a jury could 
not be expected to know whether a crime scene fingerprint bore 
any similarity to that of the defendant without the testimony of 
an expert.  However, a jury would also be unable to know the 
minute changes in the defendant’s vital signs during 
questioning without the help of a polygraph examiner.  While 
the fingerprint specialist is testifying as to an opinion on the 
fingerprint, the polygraph examiner is testifying as to an 
opinion on the autonomic reaction.  Moreover both fingerprint 
and psycho-physiological evidence help the jury determine 
facts.289 
However, even if the Province of the Jury doctrine 
applies to polygraphs, fMRI technology can be sufficiently 
distinguished from polygraphs and should evade exclusion on 
this ground.  Justice Thomas seems to think that the jury is in 
just as good a position to detect a lie as is a technician with a 
polygraph machine.  The jury can watch the defendant testify 
and, with the naked eye, catch sight of quickened breathing or 
a glistening brow.  Perhaps the jury could see even more 
outward indications of nervousness and stress that are not 
  
 286 Louise A. Jacobs, Giving Lie to Antiquated Notions of Scientific Evidence, 
22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 507, 508-10 (1999) (criticizing Thomas’ argument that juries 
will be distracted by debate over the technology). 
 287 Id. at 520-21. 
 288 E.g., Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 
1977) (Duniway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is not unusual for 
an accomplished liar to fool a jury (or, even, heaven forbid, a trial judge) into believing 
him because his demeanor is so convincing. . . . Conversely, many trial lawyers, and 
some trial judges, will admit that the demeanor of a perfectly honest but 
unsophisticated or timid witness may be—or can be made by an astute cross-examiner 
to be—such that he will be thought by the jury or the judge to be a liar.”); Aldert Vrij et 
al., Detecting Lies in Young Children, Adolescents and Adults, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 1225 (2006) (finding police officers, social workers, and laypersons all detect 
accuracy at a rate of approximately 60%, slightly better than chance). 
 289 See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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measured on a typical polygraph, such as fidgeting,290 vocal 
tension, eye contact, and facial gestures.  Therefore, polygraph 
testimony would be unnecessary. 
Because both the fMRI and the polygraph purport to 
detect lies, there is a strong tendency to analogize the two 
scientific techniques.291  Nevertheless, in analyzing the 
Province of the Jury issue, a trial judge ought to liken fMRI 
technology more closely to fingerprint or DNA evidence.  While 
both the polygraph and the fMRI shed light on the alleged lie, 
the fMRI, like DNA, measures data far less manifest.  No 
matter how closely a jury pays attention, it would not be able to 
determine which brain region the defendant used to answer a 
question.  Therefore, fMRI testimony, unlike polygraph results, 
would be more clearly “outside the jurors’ knowledge.”292 
IV. WHY COURTS MAY EXCLUDE FMRI DESPITE ITS 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROMISE 
Despite the promise of fMRI lie detection, courts may 
reject proffers to introduce the evidence, not because it fails 
doctrinally, but because cultural impressions of a technology 
often find their way into the Daubert analysis,293 and “mind 
reading”-like devices294 carry a negative cultural suspicion.  
  
 290 Some polygraphers incorporate observable physical movements or “body 
language” into the ultimate analysis.  Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 
909. 
 291 Judge Jed Rakoff, in his remarks to a panel, likened fMRIs to polygraphs 
in that the former are “more likely to cause mischief than be a real help.”  Ireland, 
supra note 18. 
 292 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998).  Michael Pardo makes 
a distinction between criterial and inductive evidence, further demonstrating why the 
Province of the Jury doctrine ought not to be invoked with respect to this technology.  
Pardo, supra note 10, at 316-17. 
 293 Vickers, supra note 32, at 110. 
 294 The media often refers to the technology as a “mind reading” device.  This 
reflects both the public perception that it is such a device (when, of course, it is far 
more limited) and the titillating effect such language has on consumers upon which the 
media attempts to capitalize.  See Jerry Adler, Mind Reading, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 
2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5304846/site/newsweek/ (regarding 
fMRI lie detection); Brain Scan ‘Sees Hidden Thoughts’: Scientists Say They Can Read 
a Person’s Unconscious Thoughts Using a Simple Brain Scan, BBC NEWS, Apr. 25, 
2005, available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/health/4472355.stm (bearing the sub-heading “Mind-reader” and reporting: “‘This is 
the first basic step to reading somebody’s mind’ [said Researcher Dr. Geraint Rees].  
‘You could use it to detect people’s prejudices’ [said Dr. Adrian Burgess of Imperial 
College London].”).  Cephos denies that the technology “reads minds” on a web page for 
“frequently asked questions.”  Cephos Corp., Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.cephoscorp.com/fmri_deception.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
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While Daubert established a list of factors meant to analyze the 
reliability and relevance of scientific evidence, studies show, in 
practice, admissibility decisions are usually not based on 
applications of those factors.295  Furthermore, the decision itself 
significantly enhanced judicial scrutiny of “junk science,” 
raising the admissibility bar for scientific evidence.296  In 
addition, since Frye, lie detectors (albeit polygraph machines) 
have been the very symbol of junk science.297  Finally, courts 
may turn to the malleable Federal Rule of Evidence 403, or the 
nearly defunct Province of the Jury doctrine298 to resist this 
evidence.  Therefore, even if fMRI technology could fully deliver 
on its potential, hopes of being welcomed in the courtroom are 
exceptionally hamstrung.  
Several of the problems scholars have raised about the 
Daubert decision involve the difficulty in successfully applying 
the holding because it leaves judges vulnerable to improper 
influences.299  First, Daubert requires judges to make decisions 
regarding science that they generally are not trained to 
make.300  Second, Daubert is often incorrectly interpreted to 
require satisfaction of all the listed factors, such that the 
technology is excluded if a piece of scientific evidence falls short 
in only one or two areas.301  Third, the vast discretion permitted 
under Daubert leads to “arbitrary, and unpredictable 
results.”302   
Judges are not scientists.  The Supreme Court surely 
recognized this, but asserted nevertheless that they “are 
  
 295 Studebaker, supra note 175, at 330; see also Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The 
Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal 
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 368-69 (2002) (“Lower courts are 
trying to determine the reliability of expert evidence mainly by a rigorous application 
of the Rules.”).  
 296 Studebaker, supra note 175, at 330.  See Groscup, supra note 295, at 363-
64. 
 297 See generally Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85. 
 298 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).  See 
also Simmons, supra note 178, at 1018-23 (discussing origins of Province of the Jury). 
 299 See Vickers, supra note 32, at 143 (“By straying from the reliability factors, 
judges may be applying inappropriate criteria and rendering inconsistent judgments.”). 
 300 Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1169-71 (2001) (citing Gary Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of 
Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 
(1992)) (noting that judges were no better than jurors at “mak[ing] correct inferences 
from probability data”). 
 301 See Vickers, supra note 32, at 120 (citing Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial 
Boundary Drawing and the Need for Context-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (1996)). 
 302 Id. (citing Cranor, supra note 301, at 5). 
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confident that federal judges possess the capacity to” assess 
“whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning 
or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”303  
While they tend to have more education, on average, than the 
typical juror, judges are surprisingly weak on some of the basic 
scientific concepts required to carry out a Daubert analysis.304  
In fact, one study showed that only 71% of state judges305 
grasped the significance of peer review.306  Astonishingly, only 
6% understood what falsifiability was, and only 4% knew what 
an error rate was.307  These concepts represent three of the four 
principal Daubert factors.   
Granted, the Daubert list of factors is not exclusive and 
judges may choose to rely on factors they more fully 
understand.308  However, the Court makes clear that the 
criteria it specifies in the decision represent many of the most 
fundamental aspects of reliability and relevance.309  For 
example, the decision refers to falsifiability as a “key 
question,”310 and tends to treat it as a pre-requisite for reliable 
science.311  It is difficult to grasp how a proper Daubert inquiry 
can take place when 96% of state judges do not understand this 
benchmark criterion.  
Studies have also shown that many judges are using the 
Daubert factors as “a definitive checklist or test,” despite the 
opinion’s explicit instructions to the contrary.312  Approaching 
the Daubert factors as a “cookbook recipe for good science” 
  
 303 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). 
 304 Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of 
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
433, 452 (2001). 
 305 State judges employ Daubert when their jurisdiction has adopted Daubert.  
See, e.g., State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 746 (Conn. 1997) (“[W]e conclude that the 
Daubert approach should govern the admissibility of scientific evidence in 
Connecticut.”). 
 306 Gatowski, supra note 304, at 447. 
 307 Id. at 444, 447. 
 308 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 309 Id. 
 310 Id. 
 311 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:15.  
 312 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do 
not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.”).  See Vickers, supra note 32, at 
133-34; Carl F. Cranor supra note 301, at 25 (“The Daubert opinion stressed the need 
for a flexible set of criteria to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence.  
Nevertheless, it left the door open for, and perhaps even invited the use of, overly 
simple, ‘cookbook’ admissibility rules.”). 
1392 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4 
underestimates the sophistication of the analysis313 and 
misapprehends the “flexible” inquiry the Court intended.314  A 
proper analysis involves judging the particular type of 
evidence, given the context, thus weighing all factors to various 
extents.315  Instead, there is a tendency to “enshrine one or 
more of the criteria enunciated in Daubert as determinative, 
thus creating a bright-line standard with which to evaluate 
proffered testimony based upon a novel scientific 
methodology.”316  For example, the RAND study demonstrated 
that, after Daubert, judges excluded evidence based on general 
acceptance at least as frequently as they did prior to Daubert.317   
In addition, judges have begun to employ factors in the 
Daubert analysis that were not set down by the Supreme 
Court, and to use these to exclude scientific evidence.318  A 
RAND Corporation study found that since the Daubert 
decision, “judges are increasingly examining the clarity and 
coherence of an expert’s explanation of the theory, method, and 
procedures underlying his or her findings.”319  Arbitrary, 
unpredictable results surely ensue not only when judges are 
meant to follow fundamental criteria that they do not 
understand, but especially when they add criteria to the 
analysis at will.320 
Furthermore, it has been shown that the Daubert 
factors are not always the reasons that judges exclude 
particular pieces of evidence.321  Rather some judges rely 
principally on the more ethereal requirements of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence: whether scientific evidence is helpful to the 
jury, whether the expert is qualified, whether substantial 
prejudice may result, and whether the testimony is based on 
reliable data, methods and application.322  In fact, while judges 
have increasingly exercised their gate-keeping powers since 
  
 313 Cranor, supra note 301, at 25 (“Because of the complexity of scientific 
issues, lower courts may shrink from the subtle but difficult task of evaluating and 
weighing the various kinds of scientific evidence for the context in question.”). 
 314 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.  See Cranor, supra note 301, at 25. 
 315 Cranor, supra note 301, at 25. 
 316 Id.  
 317 LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., CHANGES IN THE 
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE 
DAUBERT DECISION 37 (2001). 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. (emphasis added). 
 320 See Vickers, supra note 32, at 143. 
 321 Groscup, supra note 295, at 354. 
 322 Id. at 354. 
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Daubert, one study found surprisingly that opinions evaluating 
expert evidence post-Daubert do not mention the suggested 
factors any more than the pre-Daubert opinions.323   
Finally, a sweeping criticism of Daubert has been that 
the opinion has led to the exclusion of too much evidence.324  
Empirical studies have shown that Daubert has led to a 
wholesale increase in the amount of evidence withheld from 
juries.  The RAND Study showed that challenges based on 
evidentiary reliability have increased since Daubert, as has the 
percentage of such challenges that succeeded.325  A study 
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center confirmed this 
trend.326  As a result, critics opine that Daubert has granted too 
much power to trial court judges.327   
In sum, judges often do not understand Daubert factors, 
exclude evidence less frequently on Daubert factors than on 
non-Daubert factors, and otherwise misapply Daubert.  Yet, at 
the same time, they scrutinize and exclude more evidence since 
Daubert was decided. 
Because Daubert provides a trial judge with a great deal 
of power in determining admissibility of scientific testimony, 
and yet (either due to ignorance or misunderstanding) the 
judge often does not analyze properly under Daubert, he or she 
must evaluate on other criteria.  One scholar suggests that 
“judicial reluctance to rock the prosecutorial boat may partially 
explain” judges’ systemic failure to correctly execute Daubert.328  
A leading treatise asserts that at least one Daubert factor acts 
merely “as a proxy for [judges’] confidence in the expert’s 
  
 323 Id. at 365 (“These findings suggest that judges understand the importance 
of the Daubert decision, but they pay only passing attention to the suggested criteria.”).  
 324 Brennan, supra note 33, at 565-66 (noting excessive exclusion of evidence 
in toxic torts).  See also Vickers, supra note 32, at 109. 
 325 Dixon & Gill, supra note 318, at xv. 
 326 Studebaker, supra note 175, at 330.  
 327 Vickers, supra note 32, at 114 (citing David M. Malone & Paul J. Zwier, 
Epistemology After Daubert, Kumho Tire, and the New Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 
74 TEMP. L. REV. 103, 106 (2001)).  Malone and Zwier state: 
[T]he Court empowers the trial judge to cross the line between making a legal 
determination and making a final fact determination. . . . A court can 
determine that no reasonable jury could find certain facts to be true.  The 
judiciary has that power, but it is carefully exercised because we recognize 
that incautious use of such power runs counter to the very foundations of the 
jury system. 
Malone & Zwier, supra, at 106. 
 328 Schwartz, supra note 244, at 41-42 (arguing all firearm and toolmark 
identification evidence should be excluded under Daubert due to lack of scientific 
foundation). 
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opinion.”329  Carl F. Cranor discusses widespread judicial 
misunderstanding of Daubert; recognizing the effect of 
“prejudicial tendencies in both science and legal procedure.”330 
This Note suggests that in the case of fMRI lie 
detection, trial judges, consciously or not, may look to the 
cultural perception of “mind reading”-type devices to inform the 
evidentiary evaluation.  A judge’s resistance to and lack of 
confidence in such a science-fictional technology may inform 
the decision.  Several news articles announcing the successes of 
this technology have, in their very headlines, described the 
fMRI as virtually being able to read minds even though that 
formulation far overstates the test’s ability.331  The press seems 
to bank on the titillation associated with telepathy.  As a 
culture we are deeply divided over tests that betray the 
workings of the mind because they threaten our deepest 
notions of privacy as much as they promise insight.332  For 
example, the fMRI has raised extensive concerns about privacy 
interests in thoughts.333   
Entwined with concern over its “mind reading” 
implications is considerable doubt that such a device is within 
the realm of possibility.  While many reasonable arguments 
can be leveled at the reliability of fMRI lie detection at this 
early stage,334 one need only raise this issue at a water cooler or 
cocktail party to see the skepticism’s unusual fervor.  Perhaps 
we think our minds are too opaque to ever be laid bare by a 
machine, or perhaps we so desperately cling to this last frontier 
of privacy that we are willing it to be impossible.  In either 
case, there is resistance to “mind reading” technology, even one 
as primitive as the fMRI lie detector. 
The polygraph has gotten a raw deal compared with 
other technologies perhaps because of a cultural stigma.  Some 
  
 329 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 8:15 (the error-rate factor). 
 330 Brennan, supra note 33, at 566. (critiquing judicial application of Daubert 
in toxic tort context). 
 331 See supra note 294.  
 332 “‘Little if any attention has been paid to potential misuse and the 
devastating impact it would have on our civil liberties.’”  Willing, supra note 11, at 5A 
(quoting Barry Steinardt, director of the ACLU’s technology and liberty project).  
Earlier this year, the ACLU filed a Freedom of Information Act request to government 
agencies including the Pentagon, CIA, NSA, FBI and Department of Homeland 
Security.  ACLU, supra note 2.  
 333 Rosen, supra note 17, at 53.  See generally Stacey A. Tovino, The 
Confidentiality and Privacy Implications of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 
33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 844 (2005). 
 334 Willing, supra note 11, at 5A. 
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scholars assert “more science and more research exist 
concerning polygraph examination than about most or all of the 
traditional forensic sciences.”335  Nevertheless, DNA evidence 
was “accepted blindly,” even though the underlying procedures 
at the time were deeply flawed.336  Furthermore, legal 
professionals are realizing that many of the courtroom’s most 
trusted forensics fare poorly under a true Daubert analysis.337  
The “all but unquestioned [technologies,] under older 
admissibility tests, appear[] to have startling weaknesses when 
viewed through the lens of the new test.”338  Nevertheless, in 
some instances, the courts are using their discretion and 
Daubert’s flexibility to hold on to particularly prized 
techniques.339  For example, despite mounting evidence that 
latent fingerprint analyses is simply not reliable, courts are 
“manipulating the law” to continue admitting such evidence.340  
Such observations invite speculation that something beyond 
the pure, legal analysis is at play.   
Jennifer Mnookin argues in the context of fingerprinting 
that an age-old, yet faulty, notion about the reliability of a 
forensic field may cause a court to overlook Daubert’s 
methodical inquiry.341  At the very least, “[d]islodging such a 
prior belief will require, at a minimum, a great deal of 
evidence, more than the quantity needed to generate doubt 
about a technique in which people have less faith.”342  Likewise, 
perhaps a field such as lie detection, so plagued with concern 
and skepticism, may require enormously high accuracy rates 
and an extensive track record, beyond what a court would ask 
of a less stigmatized field.  Perhaps the higher standard 
demanded of lie detection has less to do with the Province of 
the Jury or the stigma of the polygraph, and more to do with 
the stubborn dislike of mind reading.  In other words, just as 
judges find that Daubert is satisfied for deeply entrenched 
  
 335 Park & Saks, supra note 221, at 982. 
 336 Id.  
 337 Id. at 981-82. 
 338 Id. 
 339 See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 258, at 66.  
 340 Park & Saks, supra note 221, at 983. 
 341 Mnookin, supra note 339, at 67.  
 342 Id.  See also 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:29 (“An excellent, albeit 
deeply troubling, example of a court straining scientific credulity for the sake of a 
venerable forensic science comes from the area of fingerprinting. . . . The 
court . . . applied the Daubert factors in a way that approaches a caricature of the 
scientific culture.”). 
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technologies, despite little, actual scientific support, it may be 
dissatisfied with novel and innovative technologies, despite 
what appears to be a high measure of reliability.    
Michael Pardo encourages courts to learn from history, 
likening the fMRI to the once-frightening photograph.343  
“Photography, it was thought, potentially could usurp the 
power of courts to determine facts by shifting power to 
photography experts, and away from courts, to determine the 
true nature of reality.  None of this happened, of course, 
because the evidence was eventually assimilated.”344  Fact-
finders have come to learn in which circumstances photographs 
might be helpful and in which they might not.345  Pardo 
suggests that the same evolution is likely with fMRIs.346  He 
puts forward the following scenario: “there may be an initial 
divergence in the willingness of courts to admit the evidence, 
but (perceived) reliable use for limited purposes in some initial 
cases may lead to an increased willingness of other courts to 
exercise their discretion and admit it.”347   
Pardo underestimates, however, the implications of 
early failures at trial.  If the first set of attempts to admit fMRI 
lie detection tests fail, it is likely that courts hearing 
subsequent requests will follow the precedents rather than 
defend a new, complicated, and controversial technology.348  
Early rejections might not only stall, but doom the technology’s 
admissibility for years to come.  One need only look at Frye to 
see the devastating effect an early rejection could have on the 
science’s fate in the courtroom, even though the 1923 opinion 
left the door open for subsequent advances in polygraphy.349  
Furthermore, early failures might dry up the private funding 
financing the research and development for companies such as 
Cephos and No Lie MRI.350 
  
 343 Pardo, supra note 10, at 311. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Id. 
 346 Id. 
 347 Id. at 320. 
 348 Brooklyn Law School Professor Edward K. Cheng suggested this point. 
 349 The closing lines of the opinion read: “We think the systolic blood pressure 
deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among 
physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting 
expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far 
made.”  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphases added). 
 350 Although federal funding, specifically from the defense department might 
not be affected.  See supra note 16. 
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Pardo also underestimates the cultural stigma 
associated with this type of technology.  The polygraph is a 
closer analogy to fMRI lie detection than the photograph 
because the polygraph, like the fMRI, looks beyond what the 
eye can see and into the machinations of the brain.  In fact, the 
fMRI technology goes even further into these troublesome 
areas than the polygraph.   Any uneasiness toward the 
polygraph is likely to be triggered in the fMRI debate as well.  
Therefore the polygraph’s troubled fate is a more appropriate 
predictor for what the fMRI must combat in the years to come.   
There are several worrisome consequences to 
unjustifiably excluding fMRI evidence.  First, helpful and 
reasonably accurate evidence regarding truth telling will not 
get to the jury.  The scope of this concern includes any trial 
that revolves around the fact-finder believing the person 
testifying.  Given the average juror’s mediocre ability to 
distinguish the truth from a lie,351 this is likely a significant 
cost.   
Another problem that will result from over-exclusion of 
fMRI evidence, given a culturally influenced Daubert analysis, 
is its effect on a race to the courthouse.  Even presuming it is 
aware of the court’s predisposition, a company such as No Lie 
MRI cannot reasonably anticipate the extent of the obstacles to 
admissibility.   Attempting too early to admit fMRI evidence 
may fail and further exacerbate the technology’s chances of 
future admittance.  Attempting too late deprives courts of the 
best evidence available in the meantime.  Furthermore, the 
inability to anticipate the court’s response to a new technology 
disincentivizes commercial developers who may be in the best 
position to develop and package the technology for courts.  
Therefore, while this cultural effect is conceptually 
understandable, it poses a significant obstacle to the 
introduction of the best new forms of scientific evidence. 
The final problem is the resulting evidentiary law’s 
opacity.  Judges have found so many various reasons to exclude 
lie detection, that it will be difficult to prepare a new 
technology for trial.352  Federal courts have excluded polygraphs 
for reasons including validity concerns, fear of overvaluing the 
evidence, Province of the Jury doctrine, and “the possibility 
that the trial will degenerate into a time-consuming trial of the 
  
 351 See supra note 288.  
 352 Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 916, 918-19. 
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technique.”353  (In at least one case, the judge thought that the 
specific examination questions were too broad and excluded the 
evidence as irrelevant.354)  The decisions, moreover, have 
resulted not just in doctrinal inconsistencies throughout the 
country,355 but in paradoxes,356 unusually shifting standards,357 
and hazy Daubert analyses.358   
Laken, the CEO of Cephos, opined that his company had 
been working hard to pass the Daubert analysis: testing, 
publishing, and improving accuracy.359  That may not be 
enough.  Assuming that fMRI litigation will draw comparisons 
from the polygraph, how can Cephos, or No Lie MRI, be 
confident entering this fray?  Even though the two companies 
will go to great pains to distinguish themselves from any legal 
precedent of the polygraph, a cultural distrust of lie detectors 
may well cause them trouble.  
Therefore, the typically loose Daubert analysis will 
likely endanger technologies like the fMRI, because cultural 
prejudice against new and contentious disciplines can easily, 
even innocently, color the evidentiary decision.  The result: 
helpful and reliable evidence is excluded, the technology’s 
developers are disincentivized, and the precedents are hard to 
interpret. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The companies vying to win market share in fMRI lie- 
detection technology have a treacherous road ahead.  While 
Daubert gave a glimmer of hope to the fMRI’s crude cousin, the 
  
 353 Id. 
 354 United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 355 See supra text accompanying notes 181-201. 
 356 Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 899 (“For example, many 
jurisdictions admit polygraph evidence upon stipulation, even though the stipulation 
does nothing to enhance the reliability of the evidence, which is the principal reason for 
exclusion.  Similarly, courts have admitted polygraph evidence in suppression 
hearings, sentencing hearings, motions for new trial proceedings, and prison 
disciplinary hearings.  Moreover, some courts have enforced plea bargains based on 
polygraph evidence.  Third, the extensive use of the polygraph by the government 
raises another paradox--especially for prosecutors challenging its admissibility.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 357 Simmons, supra note 178, at 1016 (The Polygraph “is the current (and 
perhaps final) battleground for the admissibility of evidence that was once thought to 
invade the province of the jury.”). 
 358 Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 916, 919-24 (stating 
courts allude to but do not articulate the research, procedure, and examiner 
qualification upon which they base the decisions). 
 359 Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 10:16-11:8, 44:8-45:4. 
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polygraph, it remains generally excluded.  The fMRI should 
fare far better under a proper Daubert analysis.  Reasonable 
objections, however, could be raised regarding accuracy and 
general acceptance considering the technology’s youth.  
Moreover, a substantial number of trial courts exclude 
scientific evidence for reasons not set down in Daubert.360  If 
judges, in making their evidentiary decisions, were to allow 
themselves to be influenced by the skeptical cultural ethos 
towards “mind reading” technologies, they will exclude it.  
Alternatively, a court may determine that fMRI results satisfy 
Daubert, but then immediately turn to either the Province of 
the Jury Doctrine or Rule 403 to keep this perplexing 
technology at bay. 
While Daubert permits a court to weigh the relevant 
scientific community’s opinion of “mind reading” evidence, it 
gives no such weight to the public’s opinion at large.  A frank 
discussion of society’s fears and suspicions of these technologies 
is necessary.   
Policy makers should understand that when it comes to 
issues as controversial as these, judges’ evidentiary decisions 
may be permeated by societal doubts and cultural attitudes.  
Trial courts are not immune from such deeply held beliefs and 
will find countless ways, under the available doctrines, to allow 
them to sway an evidentiary decision.  Any lawyer seeking 
admissibility for these techniques would be well-advised to 
specifically address such powerful suspicions.  To rely only on 
what is specifically demanded by the relevant doctrines is a 
mistake. 
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